TO THE NEW READER

In the body of the magazine, all material to the right of the vertical rule is either direct quotation from or objective summary of the words of the author named in the margin.

The source is stated at the end of each item. For readers who would like to obtain full texts or subscribe to publications quoted, all sources are recapitulated in an alphabetical list which includes addresses, frequency of publication, single copy and subscription costs. This list begins on page 2.

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CURRENT'S DEFINITIONS

FRONTIER PROBLEMS are basic in the sense that they seriously affect our democratic way of life, relevant in the sense that they take into account new knowledge in the physical and social sciences, open in the sense that they involve unanswered questions.

SIGNIFICANT NEW MATERIAL contains new information or new ideas or comes from an unexpected source or provides a better way of saying something.

CURRENT'S SOURCES

Current's sources of material are all-inclusive. They cover general and special periodicals; academic journals and proceedings of learned societies; books, pamphlets and reports from commercial publishers, universities, foundations and funds, citizen organizations and special interest groups; daily and Sunday newspapers, especially editorials, columns and features; television and radio commentators, interviews, forums; government and intergovernment sources; statements of opinion leaders.

The role of science in the life of the concerned citizen is a frontier problem without peer and we have conscientiously sought the significant new material on it. In December our conscience was tested as never before when we faced coverage of the 1960 Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in New York. The problem was logistical as much as intellectual. The sessions—more than 300 of them in six days—were held in 12 hotels. There were 7,000 participants from 291 learned societies. The advance program of the meeting was a printed volume of 300 pages.

Our basic strategy was to rely heavily on Current's formula. Current does not deal with scientific and technological advance for its own sake. What we seek is the social impact of science. We could therefore safely ignore the bulk of the sessions, which dealt with matters apparently of little consequence outside a highly specialized branch of science. However, this still left us with more meetings than we could cover, even with the deployment of our entire staff. Some sessions, such as most of those in the social sciences, clearly had to be attended. With others, an informal divining rod had to be our guide—even though it was a science convention. That rare nugget—a new idea—can be hidden under a dreary and unpromising topic (not quite as often, perhaps, as banalities are hidden behind trenchant titles). Nor is reputation a sure guide; the paper from the eminent scholar is too often a repetition of whatever it was that made him eminent. The highest prize is the great new idea from the struggling unknown. But unknowns frequently deserve their reputations. Still, the hunt must go on.

Our scouts brought back several dozen papers that seemed to warrant serious consideration, and also a few fascinating snatches from eavesdropped conversations that should have been developed into papers. Such was the observation that the real significance of those backyard iron furnaces in China was not to get iron, but to accustom an agricultural people to the physical feel of an industrial society.

We expect to publish excerpts from not more than nine or ten of the AAAS papers. Some are in this issue: others will appear later. Only one, C. P. Snow's, is directly on the role of science. But since it is frontier problems and not conventions that we deal with, we looked in our net to see what other sources yielded on the role of science: an article in a British weekly by a writing astronomer, overlooked speeches by two American scientists heavily involved in public policy, a social commentator's evaluation of Snow's thesis. The results are on pages 6 through 13.

SIDNEY HERTZBERG

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CURRENT

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE

THE SCIENTISTS IN GOVERNMENT

Dr. Hoyle is Plumian Professor of Astronomy at Cambridge University and author of The Nature of the Universe.

Fred Hoyle

"It is a curious anomaly that in a world changing apace as a result of scientific discoveries, not a single first-flight scientist can be found anywhere in the innermost councils of any government. It seems to me difficult to dispute the absurdity of this situation. The problem is to find some means for its correction.

"This brings me to an interesting further question: Would a scientist acting as a scientist, not as a politician, bring to bear any points of view that are not already expressed by other better represented professions and disciplines? I think the answer is yes, in two instances.

"There has in recent years been a regrettable tendency to build a mystique around the methods of science. Actually, science has only one very simple method. It can be stated in two phrases: Policies (theories) are to be judged by their results, *and by their results alone.*

"The bite lies in the second phrase. In everyday life, the usual procedure is to limit judgment by results to policies (doctrines) whose rejection would not induce a strong emotional disturbance. A policy involving strong emotions would not be rejected, even if its results indicated that it should be. Nationalism, patriotism, sex, *l'honneur* to the French, all lead to policies involving strong emotions. Such policies would cease to be sacrosanct if a scientist were placed in charge of affairs.

"The second major difference lies in an acceptance of the likelihood of discontinuities. It is well known to scientists that in certain cases it is impossible for a physical system to evolve continuously. So to the scientist there is nothing particularly surprising in the thought that human communities may also be unable to evolve continuously. Experience shows that discontinuities do indeed arise, and with considerable frequency.

"Obvious examples are the onset of war, devaluation of currency, famine, and so on. To the arts man, war starts because of a particular diplomatic complex. To the scientist, war starts because human behavior is representable in terms of mathematical equations possessing discontinuous solutions. Whenever a solution leading to a discontinuity is being followed, a discontinuity must inexorably arise. A diplomatic initiative that staved off war for the time being could not lead to stability—it could indeed only *reduce* the perturbation necessary to start war. Events that led to both world wars strongly support this interpretation. The special diplomacy involved in the months before war [is] just as irrelevant as the behavior of particular molecules of a fluid in a pipe at the onset of turbulence.

"A large discontinuity can often be avoided by deliberately inducing a much smaller discontinuity at a sufficiently early stage, well before the large discontinuity is reached. Two roads, an old one and a new one, descend a mountain. The new road descends safely, but the old road,

because of a landslide, leads over a cliff. We find ourselves driving down the old road. Our car is in the charge of traditionalists who insist very strongly that all change must proceed continuously. So we are instructed to proceed down the old road, but to proceed with all caution. This we do by driving more and more slowly as we approach the cliff. But because we are not allowed to stop—nothing in life is allowed to stop—our caution is unavailing. Eventually the front wheels go over the edge.

"The accident was avoidable of course. Back there just at the spot where we were advised to proceed with caution the new road was only a hundred yards away. True it would have been an awkward job getting over the rough ground between the roads, but how much better to have accepted the temporary unpleasantness of manhandling the car across!

"There are times in the real world when an easy continuity is potentially far more dangerous than a deliberate discontinuity would be. Perhaps by recognizing this, the scientist might contribute in a valuable way to the art of government, particularly if it can be determined how and where deliberate discontinuities should be made." ("The Essential Incoherence of a Scientist in Embryo," *The Observer*, Jan. 8, 1961)

Dwight D. Eisenhower

"The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations and the power of money is ever present, and is gravely to be regarded.

"Yet in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite." (Farewell Address, Washington, D. C., Jan. 18, 1961)

The chairman of the corporation and former president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology served as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for Science and Technology, 1957–1959.

James R. Killian, Jr.

"If we are to deal wisely with [the] application of science to foreign affairs, we must have more scientists in government and more foreign service officers with scientific or engineering education. Especially is it important for the scientific community to recognize and give dignity to these new functions. Many scientists disdain public service as an activity which is the resort only of those who cannot make the grade as practicing scientists. Some scientists, however gifted as scientists, are wholly unfit for administrative policy-making and other public responsibilities. Still others, even though qualified, obviously should not interrupt their creative work, where their contribution is unique, to accept the diversionary role of administrator or advisor.

"While recognizing the unwisdom of pressuring these categories of scientists into the public service, we must nevertheless emphasize the urgent need for more scientists who have a deep understanding of science but who have in addition the cast of mind, the motivation, and the breadth of understanding to serve effectively in policy-making, advisory, and administrative roles. The profession of science should be broad enough to give honorable estate to men of this combination of abilities; and our institutions, public and private, and especially government, which have large scientific responsibilities, must devise ways to insure inviting careers for science administrators. These scientist-administrators should be available for more than *ad hoc* advisory service. Increasing numbers of them are needed for sustained full-time activity, including careers in the public service. Especially do we need more career men of this kind in the Foreign

Service." ("Making Science a Vital Force in Foreign Policy," Address, the M.I.T. Club of New York, Dec. 13, 1960)

The outgoing Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology is a professor of chemistry at Harvard University.

George B. Kistiakowsky

"To integrate the scientific with the political, economic, military and other factors that make up foreign policy operations requires, above all, competent people who understand the relationship of science to these other factors.

"In this context scientists may well have an important role to play in the future in the policy-making process. But it will be a different role than the one to which they have become accustomed. I think it will demand a new breed of public servant, although I am at a loss to find the appropriate name for him. The term 'political scientist' has been pre-empted for a very different use than I have in mind. No one of us would want to be called a 'scientific politician,' and few indeed would dare to lay claim to 'scientific statesmen.' There is a significance here that is far more important than finding the right name. The role I foresee demands of this new breed of scientist-citizen an awareness that the scientific community must accept its appropriate share of responsibility—as well as insist on authority—for the intelligent and successful resolution of the challenges facing the world.

"Another kind of individual must be added to the team: an individual trained in the usual disciplines of the foreign service, but literate in science. The general opinion is that science is too specialized to provide scientific inputs to policy formulation except as advice from practicing scientists on an *ad hoc* basis. I submit that as valuable as such advice is, it does not fill today's requirements for a continuing and intimate involvement in the policy-making process of competent people who understand science and its significance to policy enough to work effectively with the practicing scientists supplying the specialized *ad hoc* studies.

"Perhaps science and engineering graduates should be attracted for regular careers in the Foreign Service and in our other overseas programs. I believe we must also provide a better scientific background for nonscientists in the international affairs field, and that this, perhaps, is the most important measure of all. Essential to these efforts is the development of an academic field of teaching and research in the interrelationship of science and foreign affairs." ("Science and Foreign Affairs," The Fenton Lecture, University of Buffalo, Oct. 31, 1960)

SPACE SCIENCE AND NATIONAL PRESTIGE

Killian

"Since World War II the status-seekers in the community of nations have relied increasingly on science and technology to build their prestige. The Soviets especially have used technology as an instrument of propaganda and power politics, as illustrated by their great and successful efforts —and careful political timing—in space exploration. . . .

"I believe that in space exploration, as in all other fields that we choose to go into, we must never be content to be second best, but I do not believe that this requires us to engage in a prestige race with the Soviets. We should pursue our own objectives in space science and exploration and not let the Soviets choose them for us by our copying what they do. We should insist on a space program that is in balance with our other vital endeavors in science and technology and that does not rob them because

they currently are less spectacular. In the long run we can weaken our science and technology and lower our international prestige by frantically indulging in unnecessary competition and prestige-motivated projects. . . .

"The pressures are very great to engage in an item-by-item race with the Soviets. Our man-in-space program is the principal victim of these pressures and it is certain to present some difficult policy questions in the near future. It may be argued that the appeal of space exploration by man is so great that nothing will deter his engaging in manned exploration. It also may be argued that our man-in-space program is trying to proceed too fast and that it is on the way to become excessively extravagant and will be justified only as a competitor for world prestige with the Soviet man-in-space program. Many thoughtful citizens are convinced that the really exciting discoveries in space can be realized better by instruments than by man.

"Decisions must soon be made as to how far we go with our man-in-space program and the future scale of our total space efforts. Unless decisions result in containing our development of man-in-space systems and big rocket boosters, we will soon have committed ourselves to a multi-billion-dollar space program. I have never seen any public statement estimating the costs of the successive generations of big boosters for man in space or for the other parts of the program. How many billions of dollars will they cost over the next decade or more? How much is it likely to cost to orbit a man about the earth, to achieve a manned circumnavigation of the moon, or a lunar landing? The public should have some feel for the magnitudes involved. However much they may cost, we may decide we must spend the money, but we should make this decision with a clear understanding of the startling costs entailed. We should not permit ourselves to slide unwittingly past a point of no return or to make the commitment without comparing its desirability with alternative expenditures.

"The American people must face these questions as they seek to achieve a desirable balancing of our total national effort, particularly in the use of our scientists and engineers. I do not oppose a man-in-space program. I ask that we give the public a better opportunity to understand and to debate the rate at which we proceed. They must seek to determine whether we are now proceeding too rapidly and whether we can manage the present program without weakening other important national programs, including defense. They must face up to the tough decision as to whether we can justify billions of dollars for man in space when our educational system is so inadequately supported—whether our system of values assigns greater importance to this kind of exploratory activity or to the development of intellectual quality. Will several billion dollars a year additional for enhancing the quality of education not do more for the future of the United States and its position in the world than several billion dollars a year additional for man in space? The image of America may be shaped by the quality of its inner life more than by its exploits in outer space." ("Making Science a Vital Force in Foreign Policy," Address, the M.I.T. Club of New York, Dec. 13, 1960)

Kistiakowsky

"Unfortunately, it is the technological spectaculars which tend to be used by the public at large and, often, the press as the sole measure of scientific as well as technological prowess, and thus, of military power as well. Achievements in outer space activities are, of course, the prime example of this. . . .

"I would like to make two points [regarding] the complex questions

associated with our space program, and the related issues of exploitation of U. S. achievements. One is that while the image of U. S. science held by other peoples is an important political factor, the importance of this must be kept in perspective. Except in the most unusual short-run situations, the real strength of the nation is more important than the image others may temporarily have of us. Our basic scientific strength today is first-rate. Because of this our country should not and need not carry out 'phony' projects to simulate strength or achievements. Rather we must ensure the true strength and the achievements, and constantly search for ways to project and demonstrate them.

"The other point is that science, as the symbol of the key to the future to the emerging nations, offers special opportunities to us in our political approach to these nations. We must emphasize the importance and the creativity of science in our form of society, and demonstrate in terms meaningful to others the fruits of our science and technology, thus striking a more responsive chord than other approaches could do.

"The negotiations on nuclear test cessation have shown the importance of scientific and technological factors for the formulation of national policy in this area. A similar approach had to be employed regarding certain phases of the conference on the problem of reducing dangers of surprise attack, in which I participated. The use of scientific advice and evaluation in both these attempts to reduce military tensions is, in itself, important. It is a sign of changing times, of growing awareness on the part of policy-makers that technical considerations and knowledge are essential for the formulation of sound concepts for arms limitation measures." ("Science and Foreign Affairs," The Fenton Lecture, University of Buffalo, Oct. 31, 1960)

THE SCIENTIST'S MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Britain's Sir Charles Percy Snow is a scientist, an author and a former civil servant.

Sir Charles P. Snow

"Scientists are the most important occupational group in the world today. At this moment, what they do is of passionate concern to the whole of human society. At this moment, the scientists have little influence on the world effect of what they do. Yet potentially, they can have great influence. The rest of the world is frightened both of what they do—that is, of the intellectual discoveries of science—and of its effect. The rest of the world, transferring its fears, is frightened of the scientists themselves, and tends to think of them as radically different from other men. . . .

"Whether they like it or not, what they do is of critical importance for the human race. Intellectually, it has transformed the climate of our time. Socially, it will decide whether we live or die, and how we live or die. It holds decisive powers for good and evil. *That* is the situation in which the scientists find themselves. They may not have asked for it, or only have asked for it in part, but they cannot escape it. They think, many of the more sensitive of them, that they don't deserve to have this weight of responsibility heaved upon them. All they want to do is to get on with their work. I sympathize. But the scientists can't escape the responsibility —any more than they, or the rest of us, can escape the gravity of the moment in which we stand.

"There is of course one way to contract out. . . . It consists of the . . . division of moral labor. That is, the scientists who want to contract out

say *we* produce the tools. *We* stop there. It is for *you*, the rest of the world, the politicians, to say how the tools are used. The tools may be used for purposes which most of us would regard as bad. If so, we are sorry. But as scientists, that is no concern of ours.

"This is the doctrine of the ethical neutrality of science. I can't accept it for an instant. I don't believe any scientist of serious feeling can accept it. It is hard, some think, to find the precise statements which will prove it wrong. Yet we nearly all feel intuitively that the invention of comfortable categories is a moral trap. . . . Can we ignore that intimation we nearly all have, that scientists have a unique responsibility? Can we believe it, that science is morally neutral? . . .

"With the discovery of fission, and with some technical breakthroughs in electronics, physicists became, almost overnight, the most important military resource a nation-state could call on. A large number of physicists became soldiers not in uniform. So they have remained, in the advanced societies, ever since.

"It is very difficult to see what else they could have done. All this began in the Hitler War. Most scientists thought then that Nazism was as near absolute evil as a human society can manage. I myself thought so. I still think so, without qualification. That being so, Nazism had to be fought, and since the Nazis might make fission bombs—which we thought possible until 1944, and which was a continual nightmare if one was remotely in the know—well then, we had to make them too. Unless one was an unlimited pacifist, there was nothing else to do. And unlimited pacifism is a position which most of us cannot sustain.

The moral escalator

"Therefore I respect, and to a large extent share, the moral attitudes of those scientists who devoted themselves to making the bomb. But the trouble is, when you get on to any kind of moral escalator, to know whether you're ever going to be able to get off. When scientists became soldiers, they gave up something, so imperceptibly that they didn't realize it, of the full scientific life. Not intellectually. I see no evidence that scientific work on weapons of maximum destruction has been in any intellectual respect different from other scientific work. But there is a moral difference.

"It may be . . . that this is a moral price which, in certain circumstances, has to be paid. Nevertheless, it is no good pretending that there is not a moral price. Soldiers have to obey. That is the foundation of their morality. It is not the foundation of the scientific morality. Scientists have to question and if necessary to rebel. I don't want to be misunderstood. I am no anarchist. I am not suggesting that loyalty is not a prime virtue. I am not saying that all rebellion is good. But I am saying that loyalty can easily turn into conformity, and that conformity can often be a cloak for the timid and self-seeking. So can obedience, carried to the limit. . . .

"The duty to question is not much of a support when you are living in the middle of an organized society. . . . Only a very bold man, when he is a member of an organized society, can keep the power to say no. I tell you that, not being a very bold man, or one who finds it congenial to stand alone, away from his colleagues. We can't expect many scientists to do it. Is there any tougher ground for them to stand on? I suggest to you that there is. I believe that there is a spring of moral action in the scientific activity which is at least as strong as the search for truth. The name of this spring is *knowledge*. Scientists *know* certain things in a fashion more immediate and more certain than those who don't comprehend what science is. Unless we are abnormally weak or abnormally wicked

men, this knowledge is bound to shape our actions. Most of us are timid; but to an extent, knowledge gives us guts. Perhaps it can give us guts strong enough for the jobs in hand. . . .

"All physical scientists *know* that it is relatively easy to make plutonium. We know this, not as a journalistic fact at second hand, but as a fact in our own experience. We can work out the number of scientific and engineering personnel needed for a nation-state to equip itself with fission and fusion bombs. . . .

"This we know, with the certainty of—what shall I call it?—engineering truth. We also most of us are familiar with statistics and the nature of odds. We know, with the certainty of statistical truth, that if enough of these weapons are made—by enough different states—some of them are going to blow up. . . .

More than citizens

"All this we *know*. It throws upon scientists a direct and personal responsibility. It is not enough to say that scientists have a responsibility as citizens. They have a much greater one than that, and one different in kind. For scientists have a moral imperative to say what they know. It is going to make them unpopular in their own nation-states. It may do worse than make them unpopular. That doesn't matter. Or at least, it does matter to you and me, but it must not count in the face of the risks.

"For we genuinely know the risks. We are faced with an Either-Or, and we haven't much time. Either we accept a restriction of nuclear armaments. This is going to begin, just as a token, with an agreement on the stopping of nuclear tests. The United States is not going to get the 99.9 per cent 'security' that it has been asking for. It is unobtainable, though there are other bargains that the United States could probably secure. I am not going to conceal from you that this course involves certain risks. They are quite obvious, and no honest man is going to blink them. That is the *Either*. The *Or* is not a risk but a certainty. It is this. There is no agreement on tests. The nuclear arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. not only continues, but accelerates. Other countries join in. Within, at the most, six years, China and several other states have a stock of nuclear bombs. Within, at the most, ten years, some of those bombs are going off. I am saying this as responsibly as I can. *That* is the certainty. On the one side, therefore, we have a finite risk. On the other side we have a certainty of disaster. Between a risk and a certainty, a sane man does not hesitate.

"It is the plain duty of scientists to explain this Either-Or. It is a duty which seems to me to come from the moral nature of the scientific activity itself. The same duty, though in a much more pleasant form, arises about the benevolent powers of science. For scientists know, and again with the certainty of scientific knowledge, that we possess every scientific fact we need to transform the physical life of half the world. And transform it within the span of people now living. I mean, we have all the resources to help half the world live as long as we do, and eat enough. All that is missing is the will. We *know* that. . . .

"It is within our power to get started on that problem. We are morally impelled to. We all know that if the human species does solve that one, there will be consequences which are themselves problems. For instance, the population of the world will become embarrassingly large. But that is another challenge. There are going to be challenges to our intelligence and to our moral nature as long as man remains man. After all, a challenge is not, as the word is coming to be used, an excuse for slinking off, and doing nothing. A challenge is something to be picked up." ("The Moral

Un-Neutrality of Science," Address, Annual Meeting, American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, Dec. 27, 1960)

The author of America as a Civilization *comments:*

Max Lerner

"At the heart of science is, of course, the spirit of inquiry. Some say that the scientist essentially asks questions and seeks to find answers to them, but that he is not a man who makes choices. The political leader is specialized to making choices, the scientist is not. So great is this traditional difference that some have actually laid down the principle—which is nonsense—that the scientist must be neutral on social and ethical issues.

"Sir Charles sees the nonsense in this. He points out that science is not only inquiry, it is also *knowledge,* which is the fruit of inquiry. On the basis of this knowledge the scientist too must make moral choices. I regard this as a real addition to the body of thought about the scientist's role. . . .

"But I fear that Snow's analysis stops short just where we need to go on and dig more deeply. He has raised not only the issue of the duty of the scientist to say what he knows, but the more difficult issue of no-saying when a government has reached a decision. If he means simply that scientists must speak out, one must agree. But there is the more difficult question of organizing resistance, especially among scientists, which may thwart the nation's purpose at a crucial time and perhaps even disarm it unilaterally. There is also the question of whether the Western scientist who says no to his own government is able to reach the Russian and Chinese scientists, who have no will to say no and no way of saying it.

"Oppenheimer surely had the right to say no a decade ago on the H-Bomb, but Teller in turn had the right to say yes. Historians may never decide whose monosyllabic response was more valid. But surely Snow does not mean that Teller was a yesman and conformist because his answer was different from Oppenheimer's. I shall always regard the ordeal to which Oppenheimer was subjected as a needless as well as heartless one. But Teller's choice was as moral in his own eyes as Oppenheimer's was in his. Beyond the knowledge of each man was a different set of values.

"Here I differ from Snow. It is not from knowledge that we make our choices, but from values. Scientists can place their knowledge at the service of the nation and its leaders, but the knowledge does not carry any inevitable choice with it. We know pretty well today what the chances of destruction are, but the choice of political and nuclear strategies is still a tortured one.

"My own feeling is that every yes must have a no lurking in the shadows, to mark the limits beyond which a moral human being cannot go. My feeling is also that every no must have a yes implicit in it: a man must not only say what he refuses to work or fight or die for—he must add what he will agree to work or fight or die for. A no without such a yes is arid, arrogant and perverse, just as a yes without a no in the background is comfortable and craven. In the end . . . the basic decisions belong to the people, through their political leaders. The scientist must try to inform the people, and thereby form their mood and reform the acts of their leaders. But he cannot supplant those leaders.

"The political leader, in turn, must make the ends of the society persuasive to the scientists, if he wants to carry them along with his program. He can neither bully nor punish them: he must persuade. If he is a great leader will be able to infect them with his own vision, and thus give science meaning and scientists hope." (The New York *Post,* Dec. 28, 1960)

MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK

THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN HYBRID

A professor of government at Dartmouth College examines the new role of civilians and the expanded function of the military in national defense.

Gene M. Lyons

"The historical meaning of the concept of civilian control of the military has little significance for contemporary problems of national security in the United States.

"In the first place, military leaders are in disagreement over strategic doctrine. Their differences cannot be reduced to a crass contrast between theories of 'massive retaliation' and 'limited war,' however. Air Force leaders, who are gravely concerned over the need to maintain a decisive nuclear retaliatory force, are by now acknowledging the need to develop a limited war capability. At the same time, Army leaders are quite frank to admit that a strategy of 'flexible response' requires both strategic and tactical power of sizable strength. If these differences appear to be only differences in emphasis, they are nonetheless crucial in a political process within which priorities must be established and choices must be made. . . .

"Secondly, the concept of civilian control of the military ignores two other factors that complicate civil-military relations. On the one hand, the military themselves accept the principle of civilian supremacy; on the other, they have been thrown into a political role in the formation of policy. The resignation of General James M. Gavin over the budgetary restrictions of the 'New Look' strategy is a case in point. The General disagreed with the judgment of his civilian superiors but, like General Matthew Ridgway before him and General Maxwell Taylor after him, held his most violent fire until he was out of uniform and freed from the limits of professional restrictions. His case dramatically illustrates the dilemma in which the military find themselves as they move into the center of defense policy-making. Here they have to struggle between the nonpartisan tenets of their creed and the requirements of effective participation in the political process. Their advice as experts is not only used by the Executive to bolster its case, but is eagerly courted by Congress and the public as a basis for testing the worthiness of executive action. In one respect the political role of the military tends to dilute their own professionalism. But in another, it affords them more than one opportunity to maintain a balance between their professional code and the individual conscience. The nature of the American political system thus provides an outlet for frustration which, in other settings, has been the catalyst to set off an outburst of militarism.

"In its broadest sense, the concept of civilian control of the military means military responsiveness to the policies of politically responsible government. But this meaning, too, needs to be reinterpreted in the light of revolutionary changes that have greatly complicated the formation of defense policy. Preparedness is as much the product of civilian expertise in science and engineering and of civilian decisions on the allocation of national resources as it is of military planning. At the same time, it is very often the military who put defense policy to the test of political account-

ability by exposing the bases for decisions to Congressional and public inquiry. As a result, there is a constant reversal of traditional roles, a situation that has brought civilians and military into a new set of relationships. . . . Civilians are becoming 'militarized' and the military 'civilianized' and it is these changes that reflect, more clearly than organization alone, a fundamental break with tradition in the evolution of civil-military relations. . . . The military professionals wield their greatest influence within the military departments; a large and burgeoning staff of civilian careerists exert similar powers in the Department of Defense."

Furthermore, each of the military services has its own "think" organization similar to the Air Force's RAND Corporation. In addition, many industrial companies have "think" groups delving into military and social problems as well as into purely scientific research, military research and development.

The new professionalism

"The practical consequence of all these activities is that professional advice, studies and investigations on complex military issues are being made to responsible officials" from other than military sources.

"The significance of the professionalization of civilian leadership cannot be judged without some consideration of the changing character of military leadership. . . . Military leadership is changing under the impact of two forces: the revolutionary developments in weapons technology, and the close relationship between military programs and foreign and economic policies. The management of a missile program or a test range, the constabulary duties of an overseas assignment, the pseudo-diplomatic function of a military assistance advisory group, the planning involved in a Pentagon or a NATO slot—these are the tasks for which the military must prepare the officers of the future. At the same time, the threat of war, total, nuclear, limited or conventional, and the demands that open hostilities make on military leadership are ever present. Thus the old attributes of 'heroic leaders,' the qualities of discipline, courage and command ability, cannot be forgotten. In this respect, the new responsibilities of military leaders have not so much altered their fundamental make-up as they have added new dimensions to their character and made them more complex human beings.

"Nevertheless, however 'civilianized' military officers might become, the profession itself will continue to be anchored in the distinct nature of its trade, the process that has so succinctly and meaningfully been called the 'management of violence' by Harold Lasswell. And, in the fulfillment of their mission, the military will continue to be highly influenced by the particular tools of their craft. . . .

And national policy

"The nature of civil-military relations is thus being changed through the professionalization of civilian leadership and through the broadening character of the military profession. These trends might also be expressed as the 'militarization' of civilians and the 'civilianization' of the military. When extended to their logical conclusion, they suggest new relationships between civilians and military based on a more complex division of labor than has heretofore existed. These relationships, however, are responsive to the new shape of national security in which military affairs are no longer a monopoly of the military and a clean-cut division between matters of war and peace, between foreign and military policies, is a false and misleading notion.

"In these changing circumstances, it is as essential as ever that defense planning be attuned to the broader perspectives of national policy. Civilian control of the military is no longer the most meaningful means to this

end, however. We need to be concerned with the whole complex of professional direction in defense planning and the dilemma of relating the problems of security to the goals and values of national policy." ("Civilian Control of the Military: Changing Concept," Paper, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, Sept. 8-10, 1960)

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL INFLUENCE

The outgoing President of the United States issues a warning in his farewell address to the nation.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

"A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

"Our military organization today bears little relation to that known of any of my predecessors in peacetime—or, indeed, by the fighting men of World War II or Korea. Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well.

"But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

"Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

"In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

"We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

"Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution research has become central. It also becomes more formalized, complex and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of the Federal Government.

"Today the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists, in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a Government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers." (Farewell Address, Washington, D. C., Jan. 18, 1961)

THE CONTROL OF WAR

PARALLEL ROUTES TO DISASTER

Mr. Bowles, a former Ambassador to India and Governor of Connecticut, is Under Secretary of State.

Chester Bowles

"It is clear that our defense policy and our disarmament policy are interrelated. To a degree each has an inner logic of its own. And each in its way deserves our undivided attention. At the heart of these policies lie two fundamental truths. The first is the fact that arms races throughout history have usually ended in war. The second is the fact that unpreparedness and unilateral or unsafeguarded disarmament have always ended in national catastrophe.

"These two truths are equally basic and must be treated side by side. Some of our major difficulties stem from attempts to separate them in our thinking. Those whose principal emphasis is the perfection of our military defenses are often deeply suspicious of the advocates of arms controls. Those whose emphasis is the achievement of safeguarded disarmament are equally suspicious of the military men.

"What is essential to a fresh approach to our dilemma is the recognition of both basic propositions as parallel routes to disaster. Some who recognize this fact recoil from what they see, and tell us that our only alternative is to leave the outcome to fate. But such defeatism, however understandable, is potentially catastrophic.

"Viewed from the defense perspective on survival, our problem is how to keep up with the arms race. Viewed from the human perspective on survival, our problem is how to curtail it. These two perspectives seem destined to live or die together, an inseparable if unstable combination. The central question facing us all at the moment is how to operate from both perspectives at once and pursue simultaneously the policies of rearmament and disarmament, of arms and arms control." (Introduction, *Who Wants Disarmament?* by Richard J. Barnet)

SHOULD WE REALLY USE THE H-BOMB?

A staff member of the Physics Division of The RAND Corporation, Mr. Kahn is the author of a new book titled On Thermonuclear War.

Herman Kahn

"In general, the believers in minimum deterrence seem to view the deterrence of a rational enemy as almost a simple philosophical consequence of the *existence* of thermonuclear bombs. They argue that the decision to initiate thermonuclear war is such a momentous one—the risks are so great —that it is unlikely that such a decision will be affected by the relatively minor details of each side's military posture. One is tempted to call this 'the layman's view,' since people holding it show only the slightest interest in such matters as the status of the alert forces, holes in the warning networks, the range of the bombers, reliability of missiles, the degree of protection offered by current arrangements for hardening, dispersal, and concealment,

and the multitude of other questions that bother sober students of the problem of retaliation. . . .

"If the balance of terror were totally reliable we would be as likely to be deterred from striking the Soviets as they would be from striking us. We must still be able to fight and survive wars just as long as it is possible to have such a capability. Not only is it prudent to take out insurance against a war occurring unintentionally, but we must also be able to stand up to the threat of fighting or, credibly, to threaten to initiate a war ourselves—unpleasant though this sounds and is. We must at least make it risky for the enemy to force us into situations in which we must choose between fighting and appeasing. We must have an 'alternative to peace,' so long as there is no world government and it is technologically and economically possible to have such an alternative. This 'alternative to peace' must include a general war capability as well as a limited war capability. . . .

"Insofar as the balance-of-terror theory is correct, if any nation actually becomes militarily provocative, then no matter what our previous threats have been we must meet that behavior by using limited means, or we will simply allow that nation to get away with whatever it is trying to do. The aggressor will realize this too, and he will gain confidence from the realization. For this reason any attempt to use threats of mutual homicide to control an aggressor's behavior (short of trying to deter him from an attack on one's own country) is ill-advised. Even if one intends his threat seriously, it will still not be credible to the enemy or ally—particularly if the challenge is ambiguous in any way. If this view of the mutual homicide threat is correct, then we need other external controls to coerce the Soviets in any conflicts that may arise. To depend on their exercising internal controls when there is a conspicuous gap in the range of our capabilities seems to me to be wishful thinking." (*On Thermonuclear War*)

Professor Kissinger is a faculty member at the Harvard Center for International Affairs and is the author of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.

Henry A. Kissinger

"The more the pressures against *any* use of nuclear weapons build up, the greater will be the gap between our deterrent policy, our military capability, and our psychological readiness—a gap which must tempt aggression. The years ahead must therefore see a substantial strengthening of the conventional forces of the free world. If strong enough to halt Soviet conventional attacks—as in areas such as Europe they could be—conventional forces would shift the onus and risk of initiating nuclear war to the other side. Even where they cannot resist every scale of attack, they should force the aggressor into military operations on a major scale. They would thereby make ultimate recourse to nuclear weapons politically and psychologically simpler, while affording an opportunity for a settlement before this step is taken.

"Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of conventional defense and of 'hordes' of Communist manpower are either fallacious or exaggerated. Both in available manpower and in industrial potential the free world still is superior. And conventional warfare favors the defense. It has been truly remarked that, but for the development of nuclear weapons, the defense would long since have achieved ascendancy over the offense. Even in World War II, the attacker generally required a superiority of three to one. And with improvements in conventional weapons technology—far simpler than many of those already accomplished in other fields—this ratio could be increased further still." (*The Necessity for Choice*)

WOULD THE SURVIVORS ENVY THE DEAD?

Kahn

"For at least the next decade or so, any picture of total world annihilation appears to be wrong, irrespective of the military course of events. Equally important, the picture of total disaster is likely to be wrong even for the two antagonists. Barring an extraordinary course for the war, or that most of the technical uncertainties turn out to lie at the disastrous end of the spectrum, one and maybe both of the antagonists should be able to restore a reasonable semblance of prewar conditions quite rapidly. Typical estimates run between one and ten years for a reasonably successful and well-prepared attacker and somewhat longer for the defender, depending mainly on the tactics of the attacker and the preparations of the defender. . . .

"If we have a posture which might result in 40 million dead in a general war, and as a result of poor planning, apathy, or other causes, our posture deteriorates and a war occurs with 80 million dead, we have suffered an additional disaster, an *unnecessary* additional disaster that is almost as bad as the original disaster. If on the contrary, by spending a few billion dollars, or by being more competent or lucky, we can cut the number of dead from 40 to 20 million, we have done something vastly worth doing! The survivors will not dance in the streets and congratulate each other if there have been 20 million men, women, and children killed; yet it would have been a worthwhile achievement to limit casualties to this number. It is very difficult to get this point across to laymen or experts with enough intensity to move them to action. The average citizen has a dour attitude toward planners who say that if we do thus and so it will not be 40 million dead—it will be 20 million dead. Somehow the impression is left that the planner said that there will be *only* 20 million dead. To him is often attributed the idea that this will be a tolerable or even, astonishingly enough, a desirable state!

"The rate of economic recuperation, like the number of lives saved, is also of extreme importance. Very few Americans can get interested in spending money or energy on preparations which, even if they worked, would result in preindustrial living standards for the survivors of a war. . . . Our analysis indicates that if a country is moderately well prepared to use the assets which survive there is unlikely to be a critical level of damage to production.

"A properly prepared country is not 'killed' by the destruction of even a major fraction of its wealth; it is more likely to be set back a given number of years in its economic growth. While recuperation times may range all the way from one to a hundred years, even the latter is far different from the 'end of history.'

"Perhaps the most important item . . . is not the numbers of dead or the number of years it takes for economic recuperation; rather, it is the question . . . 'Will the survivors envy the dead?' It is in some sense true that one may never recuperate from a thermonuclear war. The world may be permanently (i.e., for perhaps 10,000 years) more hostile to human life as a result of such a war. Therefore, if the question, 'Can we restore the prewar conditions of life?' is asked, the answer must be 'No!' But there are other relevant questions to be asked. For example: 'How much more hostile will the environment be? Will it be so hostile that we or our descendants would prefer being dead than alive?' Perhaps even more pertinent is this question, 'How happy or normal a life can the survivors and their descendants hope to have?'

"*Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective studies indicate*

*that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased
in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy
lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants." (On Thermo-
nuclear War)*

WOULD THE SOVIETS REALLY DISARM?

*Professor Schelling, an associate of the Center for International Affairs
at Harvard University, attended a meeting in Moscow of U.S. and Soviet
scientists to discuss disarmament.*

Thomas C. Schelling

"The Russians act as though only Americans are interested in inspection.
But given the professed Soviet suspicions of American military policy, their
derogation of inspection is hardly compatible with a serious intention to
disarm themselves. Their lack of interest in any arms regulation other than
total disarmament on a prescribed schedule could be a desire to get on
with the central business. It could also be a lack of interest in reducing
urgently the danger of war.

"So I am doubtful whether we can report new evidence of serious Soviet
interest. The interest may be there. If not, it may be cultivated. The Soviet
Government cannot afford, any more than we can, to treat arms control
solely as a matter of propaganda. This country has probably also not given
persuasive evidence that arms control is serious business." (Letter to *The
New York Times*. Dec. 30, 1960)

*A newly appointed Deputy Special Assistant to President Kennedy,
formerly an economist on the staff of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology Center for International Studies, reports on the same meeting.*

Walt W. Rostow

"As I sat there, a non-scientist listening to the scientists talk about these
stages, I sometimes felt I was in a very hopeful new world and sometimes
I felt I was mad. The world unfolding all made sense. There was nothing
about this vision that was technically impossible or even in human terms
impossible. The sense of madness arose because simultaneously with our
presence in Moscow there was the summit meeting of the 81 Communist
parties, and as we are talking now, we have Cuba, Laos and Congo. And
[there is] the really great problem of moving sequentially from limited,
turn-around, confidence-building measures to some kind of creation of
scrap heaps with adequate inspection, towards the creation of a world
order which can't really stop very short of world law and some form of
world government.

"The real problem there, it seems to me, in the end is going to be psycho-
logical and political. I don't want to be misunderstood here. I'm not one of
those who thinks that we must wait on this disarmament problem until we
solve all the psychological and political problems. The arms race is a part
of one of the fundamental causes of the political and psychological tension.
. . . If this [arms control] is going to become real, it's going to take the
form of a series of steps in which, as it were, you get interaction between
the move in arms control, a political move towards the settlement of some
serious issues, a change in psychological atmosphere, perhaps then a further
step on the disarmament front, further political steps, and a gradual build-
ing of a setting in which all of this dream might conceivably become par-
tially true. The part of it that's missing now is the part that would link this
world of arms control and disarmament to what? to Berlin? to China? to
Congo? Cuba? arms shipments to Laos, etc.? I think that it's perfectly clear
that the equivalent of partial disarmament is the establishment of some

new political rules which would govern competitive coexistence." (*Report from Moscow on Disarmament and World Security*, Roundtable discussion, WGBH-TV, Jan. 3, 1961)

Kahn

"The Soviets have recently indicated that they are not interested in arms control but only in what they call 'disarmament,' but in practice they seem to use this position only as a bargaining device when we propose some specific arms control measure they do not like. There have been several occasions when they [were] willing to discuss the problems of arms control as a related and equally important but still distinct problem from that of total disarmament or the settling of U.S. and Soviet conflicts by negotiation or other nonviolent means.

"It is often said that reaching an arms control agreement must wait the settlement of international political problems. It is certainly true that such a settlement would greatly facilitate the achievement of arms control (including even a limited disarmament). It is probably equally true that it would be very dangerous to wait for such a settlement before trying to alleviate some of the most dangerous aspects of the arms race and the general military competition. Competition will complicate the process of arriving at an agreement, for each side is likely to try to use the mutual threat to make unilateral gains, but this does not make limited collaboration impossible. It simply makes it *harder* to reach. This is one of the major differences, for example, between total disarmament and arms control. It should not be necessary to progress very far toward settling our basic disagreement before agreeing to whatever arms control measures seem likely to have mutual advantages; yet it would be inconceivable to engage in voluntary disarmament or to agree to any world government without such a settlement." (*On Thermonuclear War*)

Kissinger

"Whatever the Soviet intentions, our task is essentially the same. Perhaps no serious negotiation is possible at all. But we will be able to determine this only by becoming clear in our own minds about the purpose of arms control and by devising serious, specific schemes for attaining it. If the Soviet Union rejects proposals which are designed to increase its security together with ours—which is the essence of any responsible program—it will have given clear proof that there is no alternative to the arms race." (*The Necessity for Choice*)

The retiring U.S. ambassador to the U.N. attended 240 negotiating sessions with the Russians on banning nuclear-weapons testing.

James J. Wadsworth

"I think generally, by and large, that the Russian government has every intention of living up to any agreement they may make from the standpoint of nuclear tests or the larger areas of disarmament. Nobody in the world, including the Russians themselves, can guarantee what a successor government might do." (*The New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1961)

TECHNIQUES OF ARMS REDUCTION

An M.I.T. professor, the new Presidential Adviser on Science and Technology, has focused attention on a new gradation concept, which was discussed at the recent scientists' disarmament meeting in Moscow.

Jerome Wiesner

At the present juncture, the chief difference between the U.S. and the Soviet points of view is that "we would like a lot of inspection before we do very much disarming, and they would like a devil of a lot of disarmament

before they permit much inspection." Inspection being the central theme of any realistic disarmament discussion between us and the Soviets, it is important to realize that the amount of inspection we need is a function of just how much one wants to disarm.

As we understand the Soviet plan, they propose there be no inspection until a minimally acceptable degree of disarmament has taken place. But we regard this as quite dangerous. We, on the other hand, would like almost a complete system of inspection established before any weapons are destroyed.

As a direct consequence of these two viewpoints a concept seems to be evolving in which the Russians expressed interest and requested elaboration. This concept may best be illustrated by means of a graph on which, starting at the time of the agreement's inception, the level of arms would be represented by a gradually decreasing curve, while the level of inspection would be represented by a mounting curve.

The relationship between these two curves is such that each party to the agreement would have security compounded of a decreasing military component and a correspondingly increasing system of inspection to guarantee adherence by the opposing side. (*Report from Moscow on Disarmament and World Security*, Roundtable discussion, WGBH-TV, Jan. 3, 1961)

Mr. Laucks, a private citizen of Healdsburg, California, has a plan for "reciprocal disarmament."

Irving F. Laucks

"Instead of waiting for a disarmament conference, the President acts. He announces to the world that the United States will destroy on a certain date 2 per cent of *each class* of our arms. *After* we have done this, under fullest inspection, we invite all other nations to reciprocate. If the important ones respond we destroy another 2 per cent and so on.

"After this process is well under way, and world hope has risen and tensions decreased, a World Law conference can hope for success.

"The reciprocal disarmament process will take at least five years for completion, during which time sufficient arms will be turned over to a world police force to make it stronger militarily than any possible coalition of nations. This five years will afford time for adjustment of industry to peace instead of to war. Note that the balance of military strength is never seriously disturbed. We risk only 2 per cent to start the process.

"Reciprocal disarmament avoids many of the difficulties of inspection attached to other ways of disarming. Within five years a corps of inspectors will develop trustworthy methods by experience. It's not the first 2 per cent we need to worry so much about—it's the last 2 per cent we want to be sure of." ("Reciprocal Disarmament," privately printed proposal)

Mr. Ferry stresses that his observations represent only his own views "as a private citizen with a known conviction about unilateral disarmament" and not necessarily those of The Fund for the Republic's Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, of which he is an officer.

W. H. Ferry

"Neither Russia nor this country appears disposed in the slightest to take the lead in the United Nations in establishing the minimum international machinery that would be needed to prevent a disarmed nation from rearming if it decided to do so. The intense and complicated quarrels about arms control make it evident that it will be far easier to get rid of all arms than of some of them or a few at a time.

"Behind all the thunder about ironclad agreements is the inescapable

realization that there is no way of destroying the knowledge of how to make modern instruments of war. Accompanying this is the realization that inspection itself is, in a well-known phrase, institutionalized distrust. An inspection system, far from representing basic agreement, must always stand as a reminder of perilous disagreement." ("A Case for Unilateral Disarmament," Address, American Association for The United Nations, International Relations Club, University of California at Santa Barbara, Dec. 2, 1960)

THE PRESIDENT'S MOMENT OF TRUTH

Mr. Coffey is a former aide to President Truman for security operations co-ordination; Mr. Rock is a former White House staff member now with the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

J. I. Coffey
and
Vincent P. Rock

"In the past, Presidents confronted with national emergencies have dealt with them, as best they might, comforted by the thought that no single decision was either final or irrevocable. Today there is a radical change in the character of national emergencies, arising from the startling compression of time and space brought about by advances in science and technology.

"The action-response-action cycle, shortened to hours in the jet bomber age, will last but minutes when ICBM's are installed in large numbers. Of almost equal importance, the time between action and response in limited wars and internal upheavals has also been greatly shortened by improvements in transportation as well as by a worldwide communications network. Serious errors in judgment or loss of Presidential control may touch off a disastrous nuclear war.

"The arrangements and procedures of the Office of the President must adjust to this changed pattern. Already steps have been taken to build emergency relocation centers for the President and other key officials, to provide communications to and among such centers—or the White House itself—afford the President direct and discrete control over the strategic striking forces and the ability to withhold, to shift, or to cancel specific strikes.

"This control may be vital in deterring or in minimizing the effects of general nuclear war. Is there in peacetime the close collaboration between the President and his senior advisers (such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff) required to insure that in time of emergency there will be no surprises, no disconcerting discoveries? . . . As the President moves about this country and abroad, to dinner and to bed, to speech-making and to ceremonial functions, is there available to him a steady flow of intelligence, balanced and seasoned advice, reliable means of communications? . . .

"Perhaps the most important function of the Presidential staff with regard to emergency planning is to draw together the strings now held in many different hands, so that the President can influence pre-emergency planning, control the actions taken during an emergency or in the event of hostilities, and be able to direct any efforts at recovery and reconstruction —if these should ever be required.

"Second only to this is the need to develop a conception of planning which embraces the entire spectrum of conflict, devoting to political, psychological, and economic affairs something like the same degree of effort which is spent on military matters. It is just possible that there may be better ways to survive than holing up while the radioactive dust settles and decays." (*The Presidential Staff*, National Planning Association)

Kahn

"There are some very knotty questions that come up here about executive responsibility and civil-military relations. The most important constraint is the requirement that the President or his authorized representative have final control as to whether war is on or not, when he intends to attack, and how he intends to conduct military operations. Because any single headquarters may be vulnerable to a direct or subtle attack, it is very likely that the President will need the equivalent of many 'assistant presidents' sitting in protected places (such as underground air defense, SAC, or civil defense headquarters) with adequate communications, information, and data-processing equipment. These 'assistant presidents' will each have the responsibility, in some order or priority, to:

1) recognize that there is a state of war on;
2) assess the damage;
3) make the decision about what to do;
4) communicate these decisions to the proper places;
5) regulate and monitor the ensuing activities.

These are all very critical functions now, and they are likely to become more critical in the future.

"The first question that comes up is whether the individuals who sit in the protected headquarters and have this responsibility should be military or civilian. Some who have thought about this subject believe that if 'assistant presidents for war or peace' are appointed they should be civilians. They argue that the principle of civilian control must be upheld in this most crucial of all decisions. However, I think that in actual practice the deciding thing should be the quality of the man rather than whether he is wearing mufti or not. I find it difficult to envisage recruiting first-rate civilians for such a job—one in which they live or spend many hours a week in a military installation and have no stimulating civilian occupation. Even time-sharing arrangements are probably too onerous a duty for senior civilians to assume in peacetime. In addition, time-sharing of the one-day-a-week variety would inordinately multiply the number of assistant presidents required. No such difficulties arise, or at least not in such severe form, with military decision-makers.

"It may be important to give these decision-makers rather rigorous training courses on the various circumstances that can arise and what the corresponding decisions should be. Such training courses would be of great value to military decision-makers. Even aside from the palatability of special courses, the background and training that one would want these assistant presidents to have is a natural for a senior military commander (while quite foreign to the tastes and capabilities of most of the civilians who would be available).

"Whether they are in uniform or not, it is important to have these decision-makers responsive to Presidential control. This, in turn, may mean some organizational and administrative problems, but with some thought we ought to be able to work out an adequate system. Here, as elsewhere, everything depends on knowing what we want, and initiating the proper measures before the situation becomes critical. Since the lead time for the installations and communications is likely to be five or six years, we must face up to these problems now if we are to be prepared for the mid 60's, when the question of command and control gets more critical. Unfortunately, as far as public discussion goes, the whole problem of command and control in both wartime and the transition to war is often neglected, and it is quite possible that some serious defects will develop in our posture."

(*On Thermonuclear War*)

CITIES TO LIVE IN

ANTI-SLUM TAX

Mr. Rubloff is chairman of the board of Arthur Rubloff & Co., a Chicago construction firm.

Arthur Rubloff

"The Federal income-tax structure offers more opportunity for an investor to make money with a slum building than with a first-rate piece of property." The depreciation allowance is a deduction from taxable income that is supposed to compensate the owner for the loss of value to his property due to its "wearing out," and to anticipate the cost of replacing it. But despite lack of maintenance, slum properties almost never "wear out." They go on producing high incomes long after they are unfit to live in. When the full depreciation has been taken by one owner, the building can be sold and the depreciation starts all over again.

No matter how much federal and local funds are spent to eradicate the slums that now house one out of five Americans, "slums will be created faster than we can eliminate them unless we revise our tax laws. . . .

"No piece of property, over its lifetime, [should] be depreciated in excess of 100 per cent. Government should insist that landlords establish 'replacement reserves' as a condition for any depreciation allowance. Replacement, after all, is the reason the allowance is given. Yet many landlords have no intention of replacing their 100 per cent depreciated properties; they just look for another slum building to buy—or another decent building to convert into a chicken-wire tenement.

"Tax-assessment procedures of local governments should be changed. . . . If buildings were assessed not only on their present physical condition, but also on the income they produce for the owners and on the potential value of the land they occupy, slum ownership would become unprofitable" and there would be incentive to build better homes. [See *Current*, October 1960, page 33]

The Federal Government should also withhold assistance from communities that do not live up to the minimum requirements of the National Housing Act: "rigorous enforcement of building, housing and zoning standards; a comprehensive plan to which public and private building must conform; a central planning agency to co-ordinate urban renewal, slum clearance and conservation of existing structures." ("Let's Tax Our Slums to Death," *Look*, Dec. 20, 1960)

MAKING FEDERAL AID HELPFUL

Mr. Millspaugh, deputy director of the Charles Center renewal project in Baltimore, suggests that federal programs be designed "vertically" for each urban area.

Martin Millspaugh

"The economic goals of urban renewal must be achieved in the competition of the marketplace—the market for urban land—and this marketplace recognizes no arbitrary political boundaries. . . . Similarly, the social goals

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of urban renewal—the provision of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every family—must be achieved in the context of a metropolitan housing market which many years ago rendered the 'city line' obsolete. There is little or no vacant land left in the cities. If slum clearance areas are to be filled up with new factories or office buildings, or middle- and high-priced housing, then space must be found outside of the city for some of the former inhabitants of the slums.

"The business of renewing the central city, in short, cannot be separated from the economic and social progress of the entire urban community. Meanwhile, the entire urban community . . . is facing a new era: an era when healthy and successful communities will no longer be created by accidents of climate or location. Modern technology has made it possible for people to live and work successfully at almost any point in the United States (witness the phenomenal growth taking place in Alaska and in the Arizona desert), and to communicate without delay through the latest miracles of electronics and jet transport. In the new era, all urban communities will be competing on an equal basis: for business, for culture, and for recreation. To succeed in this competition, a community will have to establish its own character and objectives, identify the limitations that stand in its way, and act vigorously to overcome those limitations.

"The most obvious means of accomplishing this would be through metropolitan planning and metropolitan government. Unfortunately, both have proved ineffective, if not impossible, because of a political system with a built-in bias toward retaining the status quo. Metropolitan planning has been accepted as a desirable end in itself, and with help from the Federal Government, a great deal of it has been carried on. But such planning is usually sterile, so long as the political power that would be necessary to carry out the plans is Balkanized among dozens—sometimes hundreds—of local jurisdictions. The suburban jurisdictions apparently will continue to refuse to surrender any of their governmental powers to a metropolitan government. . . . In spite of the notions of some professional planners to the contrary, most people like to live among their own type. The self-governing suburb, with its power to control the zoning of land uses, makes it possible to resist the invasions of other classes and groups. It is unlikely that this situation will change until there is some unforeseen shift in the nature of local politics and psychology.

"Most of our metropolitan areas, then, appear doomed to continue in the foreseeable future as economic and social entities but political monstrosities. Is there any way in which over-all community objectives can be identified and pursued without political unity? There is one possibility, which has received attention from the policy planners in Washington . . . the formation of an *ad hoc* power structure for the entire urban community—formalized as a metropolitan development council, perhaps. Such a council would bring into one room a cross section of people with major executive responsibilities in three critical spheres: public (responsible representatives of the local political jurisdictions), semi-private (executives of public utilities and independent authorities), and private (business, professional, and civic leaders). . . . [It] would have no official status, and no power over the separate political jurisdictions. Its role would be to discover the unique character, the assets and liabilities of its particular metropolis; to express that character in a master plan of specific community development objectives; and to implement the master plan, with each member of the council acting under his normal powers in his accustomed sphere of executive activity. . . . Precedents are being set already by the

Suburbs will not surrender independence

New York Metropolitan Region Study and the Penn-Jersey Study of the Philadelphia-Camden metropolitan area. Apparently, this approach to metropolitan problems is not without substance. In any case, there is a strong desire in the land for metropolitan solutions to metropolitan problems. . .

"If metropolitan communities are regarded as . . . real communities, each with a character and a future of its own, then the orientation of federal policies toward urban problems should be turned 90 degrees. Almost all of the present federal programs which have an impact on urban areas are horizontal programs: they are national in extent, slicing horizontally across all urban areas, and designed to meet one specific need that occurs in each place. What is needed in the future is a concept of vertical programs, wherein federal policy deals directly and individually with the metropolitan areas. Federal programs would then provide a package of aids for each urban community—a package designed especially for its own needs, within a broad national framework provided by Congress.

"If this were achieved, then the first tool made available to each metropolitan area would be the assistance necessary to prepare a comprehensive master plan, under the aegis of some power such as a metropolitan development council. All subsequent federal aid could be channeled into activities that serve to implement that master plan. The result should be to eliminate the demoralizing effect of the present, horizontal federal programs, which often work at cross purposes with each other, and to place the full force of all federal activities in urban affairs squarely behind the creation of healthy communities, locally controlled.

"This would give a tremendous lift to the beleaguered cities, as well as to the apprehensive suburbs—even if there is no increase in the budget level of existing federal programs. No planner or politician could ask for a better reward." ("Urban Renewal and Metropolitan Affairs," Address, Annual Meeting, American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, Dec. 28, 1960)

A FEDERAL DEPARTMENT

The director of the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Urban Studies analyzes the case for establishing a federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.

William L. C. Wheaton

"The expansion of federal programs of aid to cities has led . . . to a recognition that our present federal administrative structure was established to serve the needs and programs of the agrarian past rather than those of the urban present and future. There has followed a growing wave of agitation for the establishment of a federal department of urban affairs to co-ordinate federal aids to urban areas and to reflect in our national government the increasing importance of cities in our national life. . . .

"Housing, urban renewal, urban highways, airports, water and water pollution, defense industries, air pollution, industrial development, recreation, and civil defense are merely the most important fields of aid which have become more or less enduring features of the federal aid programs to cities in recent years. Some of these programs had their roots in the 30's or earlier, others are of postwar origin. Some are relatively massive, involving billions of dollars—highways for example. Others involve little more than lip service—witness civil defense. Nevertheless, the scale and complexity of these programs have already created serious problems of co-ordination within the federal establishment. Even more grave problems

of co-ordination arise in what Washington calls the 'field,' that is, in the cities affected by these programs.

"As federal aid programs have grown, the problems of communication between local governments and the federal establishment have intensified. The postwar period has seen the emergence of a number of new lobbies concerned with federal-local relations [including mayors and housing administrators, homebuilders, highway contractors, railways, and the like]. . . .

"The Congress itself has responded to these atomistic pressures rather than to any co-ordinative pressures. Its committee structure continues to divide major urban problems among a host of deeply entrenched Congressional committees. Thus the Banking and Currency committees handle problems of housing, urban renewal, and area developments, but highways are handled by other committees, health facilities by still others, and important water resource problems by others again."

Policies but no policy

There exist a number of pieces of federal urban policy—the Housing Act of 1949, aid to urban highways as distinct from the interstate system, aids for hospital construction that recognize urban areas' specialized health functions—"even though the gaps between these pieces may still predominate. . . .

"What is most notably lacking, however, is any over-all federal policy with respect to urban land use and urban development or any over-all federal recognition of responsibility for urban populations. Here the contrast between urban policies and agricultural policies is most distinct. For nearly a century the Federal Government has accepted a direct responsibility for promoting agricultural development, maintaining the family-size farm, preserving agricultural land, supporting agricultural research and communicating its results to farmers through the extension service to enable farm people to help themselves to a better life. Whether or not these commitments represent a coherent agricultural policy is irrelevant. They reflect federal assumption of responsibility either through the states or directly.

"We probably cannot soon develop any coherent and comprehensive set of national policies regarding urban development and urban life. Our state of knowledge is too limited and the state of our reflection regarding the proper objects of urban civilization is quite inadequate. Probably we must proceed by the slow evolution of specific policies accompanied hopefully by some statements of broader objectives or ideals.

"Among these, it is quite clear that there must be some recognition of the responsibility of local governments and of local metropolitan area interests for the determination of ultimate land use requirements and distributions and the relation of these to the dynamic forces of transportation policy. It is clear that urban transportation policy cannot depend upon highway aids alone and must be supplemented by balancing federal aids for mass transit. It is clear that we require urban water policies which will be related to local plans and future industrial and domestic water requirements. It is clear that we must move in the direction of establishing an urban extension service which will give to urban people the training, research services, and advice and assistance they require to adapt to new ways of life. Aids to housing must be co-ordinated with these general land use and urban development policies and with transportation planning efforts.

"Finally, we may be compelled to think even more broadly about the future of metropolitan areas and their role in our society and to that end we must develop broad policies of urbanization which will deal with the density, size, and location of urbanization, with the regions in which growth

must be accelerated or restrained, and with the pattern of distribution of industry and jobs.

"The diversity of interests which have a stake in these kinds of urban policies, and the ideological, sectional, and other crosscurrents in our national politics make it apparent that much study, much debate, and vigorous executive leadership will be required before any such policies emerge as a consistent whole from the Federal Government. There seems to be agreement that only in the executive branch is this leadership likely to appear together with the requisite administrative and research resources and the resources for consultation, which can yield some more unified concepts of urban policy from the separate programs of aid now in existence or likely to come into existence. . . .

"There remains the question whether a department for cities is needed. It should be acknowledged from the start . . . that all federal responsibilities for cities cannot be vested in any single department. Such a department would be a government within the government, embracing health, welfare, commerce, labor, international relations, and defense." The serious proposals have contemplated the establishment, not of a department dealing with all urban affairs, but of a department dealing with urban development and housing. "These proposals recognize that in fact the Housing and Home Finance Agency has expanded over the years to include not only housing aids but aids for urban renewal, urban planning, community facility loans, disaster loans—and, perhaps soon, loans for urban transit systems. This constellation of aids dealing with the development of urban areas has proved to be a politically viable package of functions. It commands support from a majority in the House and the Senate, drawn from both the Democratic and the Republican parties from the North, the South, and the West.

"The Housing and Home Finance Agency has also become larger in the size of its staff and vastly larger in the amount of its federal expenditures and commitments than some Cabinet-level departments. Established as a Department of Housing and Urban Development, with Cabinet rank, it could gradually acquire those central functions dealing with urban development which are crucial to our metropolitan areas. More important, given

the status of a federal department, it could begin to develop the research functions and the training programs needed to equip our cities with the knowledge and personnel necessary for their more intelligent development. Here the contrast between the resources which we pour into agricultural research as contrasted with urban research is most sharp . . . [and] most anachronistic.

"Why should we be spending $250 million per year on agricultural research, while making no comparable expenditure on urban development research? If a department served only to establish firmly a huge research, training, and planning-grant program, it would make an enormous long-range contribution to urbanization in the United States.

"But equally important is the function of co-ordinating federal programs of aid to urban areas. Today we have had co-ordination between unequals. Like the traditional rabbit stew, composed of one horse and one rabbit, we have asked the representatives of an independent agency to sit down at a co-ordinating table with Cabinet officers of vastly greater prestige, power, and influence. As a consequence, urban policy has been dictated to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator by the Secretary of the Treasury or by the Secretary of Commerce. The political functions of a Department of Housing and Urban Development may be as important as the administrative function, however. The plain fact is that the members of the President's

Cabinet represent various interest groups at the White House. . . . Nobody represents cities.

"The national organizations of mayors can turn to no one in Washington who can present their viewpoints immediately and directly to the President of the United States. This is a political function. It is also a symbolic function, for it is important to our society that the Mayor of New York City, with a larger population and a larger budget than the combined populations and budgets of the states of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada, has no representative at the White House table, whereas each of these governors may normally look to both the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to represent him. The political act of reflecting the emergence of urban areas as a vital part of our national economy and of our society has an intrinsic value. American cities need a seat in the White House at the bargaining table where the federal pie is cut up and divided. Since cities and urban people pay most of the taxes and get little of the dividends, it is evident that their position will not be materially improved until they have such representation. . . .

"Today there is a united front of the organizations representing American cities, and they represent an overwhelming majority of the American people. . . . It is not inconceivable that during [this] session of Congress, either the executive or a newly emerging bloc of urban legislators may see the need for the recognition of our urban areas at the Cabinet table. If so, this act may symbolize the emergence of America as an urban civilization." (Review of *The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas* by Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach [Harvard University Press, 1960], *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, November 1960)

A PROGRAM FOR URBAN FARMS

The planning director of Santa Clara County, California, has seen new homes sprout on some of the rarest and most fertile cropland in the country.

Karl J. Belser

Roughly a quarter of total U.S. land is tillable, but nearly 100 per cent of our tree fruits, nuts, grapes, berries, and some vegetables grow only on specialty croplands which make up less than one half of one per cent of our land. Unfortunately, this irreplaceable land is so located that it is rapidly being lost to spreading urban development. In such a conservation-minded country as this, "it seems inconceivable that the dissipation of the small amount of area specially adapted to high-level production should escape our notice."

A program to save this land could be coordinated with a plan to conserve open space for the health, safety and comfort of the urban population. "To have our metropolitan areas penetrated and infiltrated with areas of orchard and other croplands could prove to be a practical way to disperse the traffic, dilute the air pollution, and provide the firebreaks and emergency areas required in case of disaster, while at the same time making a firm and stable contribution to the economic health of the community. There may, then, be a blessing in the fact that the interrelatedness of the urban pattern and the good land should be subjected to intensive study. There seems to be a possibility that the salvation of both lies in the consummation of a compatible marriage between them."

To establish a program of permanent agricultural reserves requires identification of the areas which qualify and application of some kind of governmental control to insure their survival. Rising land values and

tax assessments combine to tempt the farmer to sell his land for urban use. The means to resist this trend include, first, public acquisition of full title to the land and, second, public purchase of the right to develop, either by buying and reselling the land under restrictions or by buying a development easement only. Such easements may prove to be the most practical and effective device. They should protect the land from any type of encroachment, private or public, including military use, highways, schools, or prisons.

A "third method is to allow the taxes which are urban in nature to accrue as a lien against the land while only a rural tax is levied. This would tend to fortify the land against development at some future time, since these back taxes would become due at that time. . . .

"The fourth method involves the zoning of land for exclusive agricultural use. Although this method is frowned upon by some, there is every reason to believe that, if properly applied in advance of development, the profitable nature of the operations would make them tend to survive as is the case with the dairy industry in Los Angeles County. This would be especially true if taxation were maintained at levels proportionate to the activity engaged in. It certainly could be used as the first step in identifying proper reserve-type areas for future more positive action."

Dealing with this problem will require action and support at the local, state and federal levels, just as with roads and hospitals, flood and pollution control, soil conservation and urban redevelopment. The burden cannot be borne by the localities alone, nor by the few states, perhaps fifteen, most affected.

"It would seem appropriate for the U.S. Department of Agriculture to establish four or five pilot areas in which to establish such reserves." Working out a program will cost money, but we currently "pay more to keep bad land out of production than this program would cost. If the analogy of a bank may be used, we could have a solvent bank with good, economically profitable land in it. This seems to be the prudent investment for the future. . . . We may be able to live on this planet by bread alone, but why should we?" ("The Creation of Permanent Agricultural Reserves," Address, Annual Meeting, American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York, Dec. 27, 1960)

"NEW TOWNS" IN THE U.S.

**Walter Thabit
and
Thomas Conway**

What is the answer to housing shortages, slum clearance and relocation problems, and prohibitive urban land costs? "Here's a solution that's bold, yet one that's been successfully tested, since the war, from Stockholm to Rotterdam: Build *brand new* communities . . . in the pockets of vacant and sparsely developed land that dot the metropolitan area. London has eight ["New Towns"] on her outskirts. Surprisingly, in [New York City] itself and the nearby sections of Long Island and New Jersey, there are at least eleven usable sites. They could accommodate 750,000 new dwelling units, more than ample for present needs."

Skillful state and local planning, sound financing, and encouragement of private investment could make these new, self-contained communities highly desirable and relatively inexpensive. A successful example, on a miniature scale, is the 3,000-unit Fresh Meadows development in Queens by the New York Life Insurance Company, called by Lewis Mumford "the finest example of a living community yet produced in America." ("Where the City Can Grow," *Today's Living*, Jan. 1, 1961)

CREATING NEW SPACE

The architects' models and drawings reproduced on the following pages represent a common concern: population pressures and the rapid absorption of countryside by urban and suburban sprawl. They are from the Visionary Architecture exhibit of New York's Museum of Modern Art.

The text and captions which follow are from material prepared by the director of the Museum's Department of Architecture and Design.

Arthur Drexler

In conceiving their Bridge City, American architects James Fitzgibbon and C. D. Sides started with the idea that if "building components could be designed to bridge over the land it would be possible to leave various features, including small towns and villages, relatively undisturbed. It would also be possible to make use of otherwise inaccessible sites."

Frank Lloyd Wright's Mile-High Skyscraper (The Illinois) is another design that respects the natural landscape, for "ten such buildings could house the entire office population of Manhattan, leaving the surrounding area free for parks. . . .

"In 1929 [France's] Le Corbusier suggested what must be his most extraordinary solution to the problems of urban transportation and high-density housing. His idea is simple enough: instead of isolated buildings connected by roads, he suggests a road which is itself a building. . . . The implications of Le Corbusier's project are that technology and the wealth it generates makes possible architecture equivalent to the natural features of the landscape, rivaling mountains and cliffs in scale. Building is no longer thought of as the making of finite objects but as the re-creation and extension of the earth itself."

The Marine City of Kiyonori Kikutake "reflects the sociological considerations which now preoccupy so many Japanese architects and critics." To meet the needs of Japan's rising population, he proposes to build floating cities.

"Kikutake has also developed the idea of artificial land as a vertical wall plane rather than as horizontal ground planes. Houses would be attached to the wall, not to the ground. He proposes 900-foot high concrete cylinders accommodating 5,000 people. The cylinder would be built in the following way: A factory would be established to manufacture building materials. With these materials the factory would first prepare massive foundations and would then proceed to enclose itself within the concrete cylinder. When the cylinder is completed, the factory would then convert itself to the production of prefabricated housing units, which would be lifted by a crane and literally plugged into the surface of the cylinder. The units themselves resemble the lens of a camera, or, in the architect's analogy, encrustations on a shell or the leaves on a branch." (Visionary Architecture, Museum of Modern Art, New York, Sept. 29-Dec. 4, 1960)

**James Fitzgibbon and C. D. Sides, Bridge City, 1960**

Opposite are photographs of the architects' model of a Hudson River Bridge City. "The project envisions an elevated bridge complex spanning water or land areas and carrying tubular roads together with large-scale apartment houses for 100,000 people." Carried by two concrete piers on each shoreline, the Bridge City spans 4,200 feet and is 6,000 feet in diameter. "The structural system comprises three concentric rings of octahedra trusses held together by cables. Suspended within this framework are vertical cylinders [dwelling structures] and diamond-shaped decks which serve as gardens and recreation areas. The central suspended hub contains shopping areas, an auditorium and office spaces."

Le Corbusier, Combined Building and Road for Algiers, 1930

Following his proposals in 1929 for a continuous road and building for Rio de Janeiro [above] Le Corbusier applied the same principle to an urban plan for Algiers: an elevated highway [below] to be built on top of a 14-story structure, 85 feet wide and 9 miles long. It "follows the contour of the coast, as did the ancient Roman roads; just behind it are smaller curved units two or three miles long, grouped around an elevated highway which terminates on the roof of a 31-story administration building in the heart of the business center. The perspective drawing . . . shows how these 'buildings' would be used. Each level is two stories high. Families would rent . . . as many square feet as they could afford, and would be free to build any kind of dwelling. . . . This version of the project also includes a promenade level adjoining an interior highway, the latter in addition to the highway on the roof."

Frank Lloyd Wright, Mile-High Skyscraper (The Illinois), 1956
"The Illinois is shaped like a rapier with its handle set into the ground. At the center of the tower is a rigid steel core buried in lightweight concrete. This massive spine rises as a tripod from which floor slabs are cantilevered. Transportation within the building would be by 56 atomic-powered elevators. Each elevator would consist of five units, one above the other. Like a vertical railroad train, one elevator would serve five floors simultaneously. . . . Covered parking for 15,000 cars is provided at the base, on four levels above ground and one below. There are two decks for helicopters. 130,000 people would be accommodated."

Kiyonori Kikutake, Marine City, 1959

"In this project, pontoons carry a concrete deck like a raft. Piercing the deck and extending a hundred or more feet below the water are great concrete cylinders, lined with dwellings and other accommodations."

THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO

At the close of 1960, Communist Party representatives from 81 countries met in Moscow against the background of the prolonged ideological dispute between the Soviet Union and China (see Current, October 1960, page 20; December 1960, page 46). Three weeks of discussions produced a 20,000-word Manifesto, a new action program for Communist world strategy. Since its publication in Moscow the document—considered "must" reading at the Department of State—has been subjected to varying interpretations inside and outside the Communist world.

AS SEEN BY COMMUNISTS

Key sections of the new Manifesto presage an intensification of the cold war.

Moscow Conference of Communist Parties

"The policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace. Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with differing social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In conditions of peaceful coexistence favorable opportunities are provided for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries. In their turn, the successes of the revolutionary class and national-liberation struggle promote peaceful coexistence. . . .

"Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggle of the working class, of all the Communist parties, for the triumph of socialist ideas. But ideological and political disputes between states must not be settled through war. . . .

"Communists have always recognized the progressive, revolutionary significance of national-liberation wars; they are the most active champions of national independence. The existence of the world socialist system and the weakening of the positions of imperialism have provided the oppressed peoples with new opportunities of winning independence.

"The peoples of the colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and by nonmilitary methods, depending on the specific conditions in the country concerned. They secure durable victory through a powerful national-liberation movement. The colonial powers . . . never leave of their own free will the countries they are exploiting. . . .

"In the present historical situation, favorable domestic and international conditions arise in many countries for the establishment of an independent national democracy, that is, a state which consistently upholds its political and economic independence, fights against imperialism and its military blocs, against military bases on its territory; a state which fights against the new forms of colonialism and the penetration of imperialist capital; a state which rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government; a state in which the people are ensured broad democratic rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, demonstrations, establishment of political

parties and social organizations), the opportunity to work for the enactment of an agrarian reform and other democratic and social changes, and for participation in shaping government policy. The formation and consolidation of national democracies enables the countries concerned to make rapid social progress and to play an active part in the peoples' struggle for peace, against the aggressive policies of the imperialist camp. . . .

"Now that these nations are taking the path of national independence, it is the internationalist duty of the workers and all democratic forces in the industrially developed capitalist countries to assist them vigorously in their struggle against the imperialists, for national independence, for its consolidation, and to assist them in effectively solving the problems of their economic and cultural rebirth. In so doing, they defend the interests of the popular masses in their own countries. . . .

"The Communist parties, which guide themselves by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, have always been against the export of revolution. At the same time, they fight resolutely against imperialist export of counter-revolution. They consider it their internationalist duty to call on the peoples of all countries to unite, to rally all their internal forces, to act vigorously and, relying on the might of the world socialist system, to prevent or firmly resist imperialist interference in the affairs of any people who have risen in revolution." ("Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties," *World Marxist Review*, December 1960)

The Communist party of India is split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. An Indian Communist-line news weekly which favors the Soviet position reveals some of the inside discussion at Moscow. Western experts in Soviet affairs regard this version as the most accurate available.

Link

"The Chinese went to the World Conference with adamant determination to adhere to their positions. They minced no words in attacking the Soviet policies and also criticized the 'revisionism' of such parties as the Hungarian and the Polish. Their main spokesman at the Conference was Teng Hsiao-ping, the General Secretary of the Chinese Central Committee, whose rise in the Communist hierarchy has coincided with the adoption by Peking of the more rigid policies. The Chinese, however, made two disheartening discoveries at an early stage of the discussions. They found that the Soviet leadership was solidly united behind Khrushchev. . . . They also discovered that the support [for] their own views among the other parties had greatly diminished.

"Among the East European Parties only the Albanians were prepared to endorse the Chinese views. The East Germans and the Bulgarians, who had changed the least after the 20th Congress and who had once even toyed with the idea of establishing commune-type bodies in their countries, surprised the Chinese by taking a lead in attacking their 'adventurism.' . . .

"Among the Asian parties, only the Indonesians, and to some extent the Japanese and the North Koreans, supported the Chinese delegation. . . . What, however, really shocked the Chinese delegation was the fact that they received no support at all from the Latin-American and even the West Asian Communist parties. Even the Cubans, the Syrians and the Iraqis wholeheartedly supported the Soviet viewpoint. It was perhaps this virtual isolation of the Chinese delegation which ultimately compelled [them] to sign the two documents adopted by the Conference.

"Even a cursory glance at the 48-page statement signed by 81 parties makes it clear that on every major issue it has rejected the Chinese viewpoint and vindicated the Soviet stand. The original draft of the statement

was prepared by the Soviet delegation and in spite of the many verbal changes that it underwent in the course of discussions it retains the entire spirit and emphasis of the Khrushchev conception. . . .

"The biggest defeat suffered by the Chinese was on the question of world communism's attitude towards the newly freed countries of Asia and Africa. The Chinese treated the governments of these countries as potentially hostile elements. They gave no importance to their anti-imperialist role in world affairs and preached the inevitability of a civil war and peasant guerrilla struggle as the only way to eliminate all vestiges of imperialism and feudalism in these countries. The Moscow Conference not only recognized the newly liberated, nonaligned countries as reserves and allies of the socialist world, it also discarded the old strategic slogan of People's Democracy and the related Comintern concept that the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution can only be fulfilled under proletarian (i.e., Communist) leadership. Instead, the statement advances a wholly new category in Marxist thought and places the task of establishing and defending 'independent national democracies' before the Communists of all dependent and newly independent countries.

"The statement recognizes that 'the people of the colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and by nonmilitary methods, depending on the specific conditions in the country concerned.' It settles the controversy about the role of the 'national bourgeoisie' by declaring that the latter in spite of its unstable and compromising nature still 'retains the capacity of participating in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism.' It recognizes the imperative need of building 'a single national democratic front' to fulfill the 'urgent tasks of national rebirth.' . . . The statement sums up the tasks of Communists in Asian, African and Latin-American countries in the single aim of the establishment of an 'independent national democracy.' . . . It is clear from the definition that the term is valid for the present regimes in countries like India, Ceylon and Cuba. . . .

"Keeping in mind the Chinese habit of agreeing to common decisions at inter-party conferences and then ignoring or twisting them according to their convenience, the statement (for the first time since the dissolution of the Cominform) makes it obligatory for every Communist party to adhere to 'the estimates and conclusions . . . jointly reached by the fraternal parties at their meetings.' It declares that 'the prevention of any actions which may undermine the unity' of the World Communist Movement is an essential condition for its victory. . . .

"As against this wholesale repudiation of the Chinese theories, policies and claims, the few concessions granted to Peking seem very insignificant. One concession takes the form of a reiteration that revisionism remains the 'main danger' in the Communist movement, though its value has been undermined by the statement at another place that the Communist parties have already 'ideologically defeated the revisionists in their ranks' and even more by the affirmation that 'dogmatism and sectarianism in theory and practice can also become the main danger at some stage of development of individual parties.'

"Another concession is the extra-vigorous condemnation of the Yugoslav variety of 'modern revisionist theories in concentrated form,' and the Yugoslav Communists' 'subversive work against the socialist camp and the World Communist Movement.' The Soviet Party had to make these concessions in order to get such Communist parties on their side as were tending to side with the Chinese out of a fear of internal 'revisionist' pressure.

"The Chinese leaders' willingness to sign a document which so completely negates their policies is, of course, not the end of the story. How serious they are in implementing the Moscow Conference decisions in practice and how they explain these decisions to their own people will be watched with great concern by Communist circles all over the world." ("Khrushchev Wins at Red Summit," *Link*, Dec. 18, 1960)

In an interview—given prior to the Moscow meeting—with Edgar Snow, Look's special correspondent in Red China, the Chinese Premier acknowledges "differences" between China and the U.S.S.R.

Chou En-lai

"The Communist parties and the Governments of China and the Soviet Union, as well as those of other socialist countries, all believe in Marxism-Leninism and formulate their policy by integrating the principles of Marxism-Leninism with the specific conditions of their respective countries. Having the same belief and the same system, they share the same over-all principles and go along the same general direction.

"But this is not equivalent to saying that the two parties have no differences in the way they look at certain questions, nor does it mean that there is no difference in emphasis in the policies of the two countries. (In a subsequent discussion, the Premier stated that the word 'differences,' as a translation of the word *ch'a-pieh,* which he used, was more emphatic than its Chinese meaning, which he suggested would be more exactly conveyed by the word 'dissimilarities.' Here I retain the wording of the official transcript.—E.S.) To have no difference whatsoever is impossible in the realm of thinking. Even in the thinking of a single person, one sometimes looks at a question in one way and at another time in another way. In a specified period of time, it is a natural thing that there are some differences between two parties on theoretical questions and on ways of looking at things. To be exactly identical would indeed be something strange and incomprehensible. . . .

"The two parties and Governments of China and the Soviet Union, as well as all the other socialist countries, are as one in their opposition to imperialism and to the imperialist policies of aggression and war. They are all engaged in building socialism and communism. They all advocate peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. Therefore, peaceful coexistence is not a matter of tactics; it is the policy of the socialist countries in their foreign relations. Although the socialist states advocate peaceful coexistence, the imperialists, however, won't have it. They persist in waging cold war, in carrying on threats of war and in effecting encirclement, intervention and espionage. The socialist countries are resolutely opposed to all these things. We stand for peaceful coexistence and are opposed to the imperialist policies of 'positions of strength' and cold war." ("A Report from Red China," *Look*, Jan. 31, 1961)

AS SOVIETOLOGISTS SEE IT

The appearance of the 20,000-word Manifesto brought forth a range of analytical comments by experts in the West.

An analysis prepared as a policy guide to its script writers by the Central Research Department of Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. from Munich, Germany:

Radio Liberty

"Like its predecessor in 1957, the declaration is a militant document. It lays down both a strategic plan and tactical blueprint for the ultimate

worldwide defeat of capitalism. Under these circumstances it may be irrelevant to ask whether Moscow or Peking has 'won' at the Moscow summit. Khrushchev seems to have gotten all his major points accepted, but significantly there is no overt approval of Khrushchev's policy of summitry and nothing that even smacks of a resumption of 'Camp David' type of diplomacy.

"The foreign policy of socialist countries is said to be the policy of 'peaceful coexistence and economic competition.' But the important matter of tone and emphasis is well illustrated by the nutshell definition of peaceful coexistence given by the new declaration: '. . . a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace and for disarmament.' If Peking has been persuaded to continue endorsing peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev has had to put more teeth into the definition of that policy. For example, 'peaceful coexistence does not mean an armistice of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it presupposes intensification of the struggle . . . for the triumph of socialist ideas.'

Disarmament offensive

"The document makes it clear that a massive new propaganda drive for disarmament is to be expected, and the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament is hailed. It is made clear by the context that this is viewed less as a renewed diplomatic offensive than as a new tactic of 'mobilizing the masses' so as 'to force the imperialists into an agreement on general disarmament.' . . .

"As expected, the document endorses the notion that 'war is not fatally inevitable.' The reason cited is the rather unconvincing argument that the socialist and peace camp is so strong that imperialists no longer have the initiative to conduct either a general or local war. This seems to be a point on which the Chinese definitely acquiesced to the Soviet view because it goes on to say, 'Prevention of global thermonuclear disaster is a primary task.' . . .

Neutralists by another name

"At least one new major political term has been introduced into the Communist lexicon by the declaration. It is the concept of states which can be labeled 'national democracies' but are definitely anti-imperialist. In short, they are 'neutralist' countries by another name, but special kinds of neutrals in which ideal conditions exist for the local Communist party to work for the socialist revolution. A national democracy is defined as 'a state which consistently upholds political and economic independence, fights imperialism and the latter's military alignment, and opposes bases on its own territory; a state that resists new forms of colonialism and the infiltration of imperialist capital; rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government; a state in which the people are insured broad and democratic rights and freedoms.' This new formula is loose enough to be applied to a great many currently neutralist states (such as India, Indonesia, etc.), but it also is obscure enough to leave unclear for whom it really is intended. For example, South Vietnam and Laos are listed as struggling for national democracy. . . .

Revisionists and dogmatists

"The treatment of revisionism-dogmatism is a special topic on which preliminary research indicates a major triumph for Moscow over Peking. But one paragraph indicates that only 'jointly decided estimates, and conclusions' at international Communist gatherings 'demand the adherence' of every Communist party. This leaves room for interpretation. Does it foreshadow the eventual establishment of a new agency for 'joint' decision of Communist world policy, a new Comintern? While it obviously represents a pledge by Peking that it will not stab Khrushchev in the back in his international diplomacy, does it not by the same token impose obligations on

Khrushchev which will limit his flexibility in world tactics and timing—a limitation which presumably caused him to face up to the Chinese disagreement in the first place?

"In short, the new declaration paints a deceptively monolithic picture of Communist goals and interpretations, which are widely at variance with the degree of basic divergence of views known to exist; at variance also with the acrimony and the long deliberation involved in the Moscow summit meeting. . . . And on the other hand, skepticism should not let one rule out the realistic possibility that a workable truce has been achieved, which may lay to rest the Sino-Soviet dispute for a certain period during which a more or less co-ordinated pattern of Communist challenge is presented to the free world. In either case, the Moscow declaration of 1960 is a historic document deserving of the most intense scrutiny and analysis—both for what it says and what it leaves half-said." ("Statement by Leaders of 81 Communist Parties: An Analysis," Central Research Department, Radio Liberty)

An appraisal of the conference by Soviet émigrés at The Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. at Munich predicts that the agreement reached at Moscow is unlikely to endure.

The Institute for the Study of the USSR

"An analysis of the declaration indicates that the present solution is merely a temporary compromise between Moscow and Peking. The Soviets have been accorded the leading position in the world Communist movement, but all the disputed points have been formulated in accordance with the Red Chinese demands. The declaration notes that the 'Soviet Union is the first country in history to lay the path to communism for all mankind. It is the brightest example and most powerful support for the peoples of the entire world.' On the other hand, 'the people's revolution in China has inflicted a crushing blow on the imperialists in favor of socialism, has given a new impetus to the national-liberation movement, and has exerted an enormous influence on peoples, particularly on the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.' The honors accorded the Soviet Union are not Khrushchev's, however. The Premier himself and his policy are not mentioned at all in the declaration. . . .

"The main thesis of the declaration is the revival of the idea of revolution. Communist parties in the non-Communist countries are ordered to make 'the masses understand the tasks of the socialist revolution and the need to carry it out.' The declaration guarantees protection from 'interference by the imperialist powers' to those peoples which revolt: 'Communist parties consider it their international duty to call upon peoples of all countries to unite, to mobilize all their internal forces, to act, and, leaning on the aid of the world socialist system, to avert or decisively rebuff the interference of the imperialists in the affairs of the people of any country which has risen in revolution.' The declaration suggests that areas for the implementation of this policy will be Indochina, Algeria, Cuba, Latin America as a whole, the Congo, Berlin, and Germany." ("The Moscow Conference of Communist Parties," Soviet Affairs Analysis Service No. 12, 1960-61)

The Soviet affairs expert of The New York Times concludes that concessions were made by both sides.

Harry Schwartz

"The essence of the compromise appears to be Peiping's approval for further attempts at summit negotiation with the West by Premier Khrushchev. Moscow, in turn, has agreed to accept the Chinese Communists'

demand for a maximum 'struggle' against capitalism throughout the world by all means, including armed revolution. . . .

"The compromise nature of the . . . statement is reflected in the careful wording on the question of the inevitability of war. The issue has been central in the Moscow-Peiping debate over the last year.

"As long ago as 1956 Premier Khrushchev insisted war was no longer inevitable. The Chinese Communists indicated much more recently that they doubted that view. The prediction now made is that in the 'near future' Communist forces will gain new successes and capitalism will be further weakened. . . . The practical implication of this compromise is that if the near future does not bring the gains the Communists expect, the Chinese Communists will have warrant for raising the question of the inevitability of war again. . . .

"Premier Khrushchev appears to have made some gains. . . . The statement endorses his call for peaceful coexistence and the principle of negotiation with the West. It calls the Communist party of the Soviet Union 'the universally recognized vanguard of the World Communist Movement' and it strongly condemns 'dogmatism and sectarianism.' In the past the Soviet Union has covertly charged Communist China with dogmatism and sectarianism. The statement says these heresies 'can also become the main danger at some stage of development of individual parties.'

"The statement also grants that Marxism-Leninism experiences a 'continuous enrichment through a comprehensive analysis of reality.' This is weaker than Premier Khrushchev's assertion last June that some parts of Marxism-Leninism were obsolete and had to be updated. But it leaves room for his future contributions to Marxism-Leninism.

"The Chinese Communists can also point to gains in the new statement. Underestimation of the possibility of a new world war—a charge Peiping has levied against Moscow—is now equated as a doctrinal error. Hostility to the United States as the chief enemy is now securely established as a basic tenet of Communist doctrine. Any Communist notions that the United States may have become peace-loving—such as seemed implied during the period of Eisenhower-Khrushchev amity in late 1959 and early 1960—are now denied.

"The statement accepts the Chinese position that a third world war would not mean the end of all civilization, but only of capitalism.

"The statement also contends that peaceful coexistence does not mean a real truce with capitalism, but rather provides 'favorable opportunities . . . for the development of the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries.'

"Since the 'progressive' nature of national liberation wars is also recognized, this, in effect, seems to mean that the Chinese Communists have carte blanche to urge the most militant struggle possible against capitalism everywhere, even at the risk of war." (*The New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1960)

The Soviet affairs expert of The Observer (*London*):

Edward Crankshaw

"This conference was more than a meeting, it was clearly a close and sometimes passionate debate. In 1935 Stalin gave orders; in 1960 Khrushchev had to argue, and sometimes to give ground.

"Objectively, to use a favorite Communist word, the Moscow declaration . . . is a preposterous document. . . . There is only one solitary new idea to show for forty-three years of Soviet development, and that idea, that war should and may be avoided, presented with an array of quasi-

philosophic jargon, is the sort of thing that could be expected to occur to any child of twelve.

"For the rest the declaration, though so dynamic and aggressive, is intellectually stagnant and the polemical tone takes us back to the days of Stalin. As an intellectual essay, as a summing-up of the political thought of a group of men who say that they represent forces which are already the strongest in the globe, it is more than preposterous, it is beneath contempt. . . .

"Lately the Soviet Union under Mr. Khrushchev has appeared to many non-Russian Communists, and to some Russian Communists too, to be forgetting her obligations as a leader of an international movement in the enjoyment and intoxication of functioning as a great power. Mr. Khrushchev in signing this document has receded temporarily from his position of the head of a great power and put himself forward as the leader of a great movement, which includes another great power, China. In return he has been confirmed in his position.

"He has carried, at least for the time being, his two great points—that war must be avoided and that some countries may achieve revolution without violence. In return he has had to lend his name to an aggressive and brash declaration of the Communist dynamic. For him it has indeed been a qualified victory. Foreign Communist parties, and especially China, needed more than a reassuring declaration that what is good for the Soviet Union is good for communism: communism had to be put first.

"But although there are passages in the document which may be variously interpreted, so that the old quarrels will almost certainly flare up again, and although Mr. Khrushchev has been forced to abandon . . . his new approach to Marshal Tito, he has succeeded in some measure in so weighting this new manifesto of Communist intentions that what is said to be good for communism is, in the most vital context of war and peace, good for the Soviet Union too." (*The Observer*, Dec. 11, 1960)

A Soviet affairs expert writing in The Christian Science Monitor:

Paul Wohl

"Communist leaders may not be as certain of ultimate victory as they want the world to believe. Anticommunism, nationalism, and independent thinking seem to disturb them at least as much as differences between Moscow and Peking. This is the most salient feature hidden behind the verbiage of world communism's latest policy statement and analysis of the international situation.

"Communism is seen as threatened from four sides:

"1) The allegedly disintegrating capitalist society is said to be engaged in an ideological offensive against the 'moral and political unity' of the Communist world. 'Anticommunism,' resorting to 'monstrous distortions,' comes in through the air, openly, and slyly, as outright propaganda or as the demonstration of a way of life. Most dangerous of all, the Communist leaders think, is the reasoning anticommunism which quotes their own statements against them and compares promises and deeds. This 'anticommunism must be vigorously exposed.'

"2) 'Manifestations of nationalism and national narrow mindedness do not disappear automatically with the establishment of the socialist system. . . . Bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism continue to survive,' even among the 'working people,' the Communist leaders complain. . . .

"The peasants are especially reluctant to accept socialist thinking. 'It is a long struggle that will go on until the complete emancipation of the minds of the people from the survivals of bourgeois ideology.'

"3) Another danger looms in the new countries, where the 'national bourgeoisie' is described as a necessary but 'unstable' ally of a Communist-led national liberation movement. This national bourgeoisie consists of the indigenous middle class, enterprising individuals with technical know-how and organizing ability, who want to do themselves much of what they have seen done in capitalist countries.

"The Communists describe this element as 'in a sense, progressive,' but are apprehensive lest it might develop popular movements, which would turn not only against foreign capitalist 'monopolies,' but also against the emissaries of the 'socialist countries' and their native acolytes.

"4) Then there is 'the subversive work' which the Yugoslav leaders carry on against the socialist camp 'under the pretext of an extra-bloc policy.' This 'subversive work' by Yugoslavs and Social Democrats also makes itself felt inside the Communist parties of the capitalist world, especially in Europe. . . .

"Of the four dangers which the statement has singled out, anticommunism growing out of the 'persistent survivals of capitalism in the minds of the people' seems to disturb the Communist leaders most, with nationalism next in importance. Communism seeks to fight these dangers with new tenets. According to the statement adopted in Moscow, 'moral and political unity of society has for the first time in history come into existence in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries.' This idea of 'moral and political unity' hitherto figured more frequently in the vocabulary of various brands of national socialism, fascism, phalangism, synarchism, etc Now it is to be communism's antidote against the 'alienation' of the individual in the commercial society of capitalism.

"Another terminologically new formula is the promise to 'educate' the working people in 'a spirit of internationalism and patriotism.' The term socialist 'patriotism' is used repeatedly in the Moscow statement, usually in conjunction with socialist internationalism, two notions which, according to the Communist catechism, are to be thought of as complementary.

"Significant also is the renewed insistence on 'national peculiarities.' 'Disregard of national peculiarities may lead the party of the proletariat to become isolated from reality, from the masses. . . . The experience of other socialist countries must not be copied mechanically,' the Communist leaders warn. Only in a general way 'are the peoples of the socialist countries creating a prototype of a new society for all mankind.' Practically, there may be variations in accordance with national traditions.

"These are generalities which in a similar form have been heard before. They are meaningful only because they show that the Communists do not find the going as easy as they want their audience to believe." (*The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 7, 1960)

A special correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor *concludes that "there are now two Romes in the Communist world: There is no longer a single recognized and universally accepted voice of Communist authority."*

Joseph C. Harsch

"The Communist summit conference in Moscow was indeed the greatest Donnybrook in the history of communism, . . . the issues were contested with a stubbornness and vehemence novel in the movement and . . . the net result was agreement on duality of leadership between Moscow and Peking.

"No Westerner can be entirely certain that dual leadership of a political movement like communism is impossible over any substantial length of

time. There are novelties in communism, and this further novelty might conceivably be sustained.

"It is, however, a fact that no such dualism of leadership ever has worked on any comparable scale. This is the reason why Western foreign offices increasingly incline to the view that the issues between Moscow and Peking are irreconcilable and that the compromise which papered them over in Moscow in November is a fragile fabric which cannot long survive." (*The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 16, 1960)

AS SEEN BY "REVISIONISTS"

"Yugoslav revisionists"—the middle-of-the-road Yugoslav Communists caught in the dialectical crossfire between the Russians and Chinese—were condemned in the Manifesto. Yugoslav spokesmen reply:

Josip Broz Tito

"We are accused in the Moscow statement of having estranged ourselves from the socialist countries. Who was it that denounced the economic agreements which we had with the socialist countries? It was not we. Who was it that in this way caused us enormous damage when because of this we were compelled in the most difficult conditions to seek a substitute for these agreements on the other side, in the West? All this is generally known today and the authors of the present statement about Yugoslavia must also remember it.

"Instead of assistance in the course of the years which have passed it is just from the East European countries that the greatest difficulties were caused to the Yugoslav peoples in their efforts to build a happier future.

"We know that on this occasion the main initiators were the Chinese delegates, that is the representatives of a party whose leaders proclaim everything to be Marxism and Leninism. But, is it admissible from the standpoint of socialist morality to reach a rotten accord at the expense of a small socialist country by means of false charges?" (Address to Yugoslav National Assembly, Dec. 26, 1960)

A Yugoslav Communist theoretician:

Vukashin Micunovic

"The authors of the declaration were not prepared to take the bull by the horns, i.e., to try to solve the problems existing within the socialist world. It is not difficult today to demonstrate one's own progressiveness by attacking capitalism. It is much more significant and beneficial for the development of socialism to perceive and remove all phenomena which slow down this development. This can least be achieved by unprincipled attacks against a socialist country, attacks which are nothing but a concession to the bureaucratic and pseudo-revolutionary forces in the workers' movement."

The Moscow meeting "did not consider it opportune to mention the deviationism in the views and practice of some parties, above all in the Chinese Communist party, despite the fact that the Moscow meeting was convened precisely to discuss and condemn these deviationisms. The conclusion is quite logical. When it comes to the attitude of the representatives of a big country, then nothing is mentioned at all. However, when a small socialist country is in question, in this case socialist Yugoslavia, everything is allowed.

"Where are here the principles of equality between big and small countries in general, and within the socialist world in particular? Obviously, the Moscow meeting has not contributed to the overcoming of this problem but on the contrary it has sharpened it even more." (*Borba*, Dec. 11, 1960)

EMERGING AFRICA

ON THE BRINK OF RACISM

Mr. Lomax, an American, a journalist, and a Negro, reports that he "was allowed to be one with them" during his visits with African leaders.

Louis E. Lomax

" 'Now get these things firmly rooted in your mind. . . . Africans are Africans . . . *not* natives! . . . *not* Negroes! And as far as the Africans are concerned, no white man is an African! They are *Europeans, Americans* or just plain white men. But *Africans?* Never! It doesn't matter how long he or his ancestors have been in Africa, he is NOT an African.'

" 'And another thing,' the younger man interposed, correcting yet another of my innocent mistakes, 'don't refer to African homes as "huts." They are homes, just like your split-level out in Queens.'

" 'The trouble with most American Negroes,' he added, 'is that when they go to Africa they go just like the white man: they think like him; they act like him; they react as he reacts. That is why they don't get to see too much; that is why they don't understand what little they do see.'

"We three black men were seated at a table in the Red Rooster, the favorite haunt of Harlem's black bourgeoisie. The man to my left, a gifted American intellectual and former lecturer at New York University, had just returned from Africa, where for four years he had served as economic adviser to one of the independent states. The younger man was a student from Kenya now studying in the United States. In a week I would be off for a two months' reporter's tour of Africa south of the Sahara, to meet the men who are generating the wind of change Prime Minister Macmillan feels blowing through that entire continent; I would sit in on closed meetings, see African politicians at work in unguarded moments, go behind the emotional façade of freedom and be given a candid view of the economic, political and personal power forces now at work in Africa.

"My African contacts here and in Africa had warned me, however, that if I really wanted to understand what I saw and heard I must first be turned into an African. I must think black, feel black, act black, love black, demonstrably suspect everything and anything nonblack, and talk black—a new jargon peculiar to African nationalists; a patois designed to adulate everything black, to deprecate everything white. My two table companions had kindly offered to teach me the art of being an African. I had come to learn. . . .

"The three subsequent sessions, as well as that first one, were not easy for my tutors or for me. Their anguish, however, was fleeting, a momentary disgust with an argumentative student. Mine was deeper; I did not know it then, but my anguish was to linger. . . .

" 'You are going to die from an overdose of integration yet,' the former N.Y.U. lecturer told me when I suggested that multiracialism was the better part of common sense in a place like Kenya. . . .

"The Africans suspected me, too, for a while, ('Even if you wrote the truth they would not print it.') But in time a mystical thing called the black brotherhood—understood, I am certain, only by the Africans—en-

gulfed them and me. I was allowed to be one with them, to see practically all there was to be seen. I was told more than it is comfortable for me to know."

In Cairo Mr. Lomax found that Nasser has brought about "both the Egyptianization and the Africanization of Egypt."

"The Nile forks at Cairo, and in Zamalek, a section of the island between the two branches, an imposing array of African freedom fighters sit in luxuriously furnished offices turning out protests against colonialism and white domination. Exiles from Uganda, Somali, Kenya, the Cameroons, Nigeria and Chad had offices in Cairo when I was there. In the six weeks since I left, exiles from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Southwest Africa have also set up camp along the banks of the Nile. Late at night, Radio Cairo booms down into Africa in several dialects: 'Freedom!' 'Independence!' 'Down with imperialism!' 'Beware of Israel!'

"Exiled Africans are special guests on these programs. This is how they flash signals back home; this is how the fire of freedom is kept burning against the day when independence will come. And it is in Egypt, not too far from Cairo, that the core of an international black army dedicated to the liberation of Africa is being formed.

"Who pays for all this?

"The three African organizations, the All-African Peoples Conference, the Conference of Independent African States and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, maintain special funds for the support of Africans in exile. The money for this operation is held by the various secretariats, but several independent countries, Guinea, Ghana and the U.A.R. particularly, make separate direct contributions to African exiles.

"To a man the freedom fighters in Egypt are 'guests' of the U.A.R. government. This is their grubstake. Once they are in Cairo, thus certified as legitimate, the African exiles get overtures from both wings of the Communist bloc. They are invited to attend 'student rallies' in Peking, 'African seminars' in Moscow.

"How do they get to Peking and Moscow?

"I put the question to several freedom fighters and found that an honest-to-God African exile, particularly if he has been put in jail by the British, French or Belgians, can get an all-expense-paid trip to Moscow or Peking —usually both—plus three thousand dollars 'personal money.'

"I asked one freedom fighter why he needed three thousand dollars in personal expenses.

" 'Well,' he said in a clipped British accent, 'one can't go to Peking naked even though everybody in Peking is naked, can one?'

"The impact of Russia and China on these exiles is cause for concern. They are not converted to communism—they suspect it—but they are led to believe that the Communist governments are sympathetic to their cause while the Western governments are not. Thus they move onto the no-man's land of nonalignment and set out to finance their movements with money extracted from as many sources as possible.

"The freedom fighters admire Nasser even if they do not trust him. They resent having their phones tapped, their mail censored. But this happens to everybody in Egypt. They think Nasser's stance as a black African is a bit strained, yet they cannot deny that, in a very real sense, the Egyptian people have come to feel one with the Africans. The gravest suspicion of Nasser stems from the fact that he harbors not only exiles moving against colonialism and white domination, but also those exiles fighting against

African politicians in their home states. For example, the bitterest opposition to Kenya's Tom Mboya comes from two Kenya freedom fighters in Cairo. There is no bar against African politicians in Cairo and Mboya has quite a lively African opposition there. The Kenyans in Cairo are 'Nasserites,' men who oppose Mboya because he allegedly has accepted 'Jewish' money. . . .

Nasser's Investment

"Beyond all this, however, there is an extremely personal dimension to this Nasser operation. Freedom fighting is lonely business. African exiles find themselves thousands of miles away from home, parted from their families, friends, the traditions they loved so deeply. In time, these men develop roots in Egypt. The result is a human bond which will stand Nasser and the U.A.R. in good stead once these men bring independence to their lands. . . .

"At the center of their gratitude will be Nasser and Egypt, a man and a land who stood *in loco parentis* during their time of trouble. This is futuristic and personal diplomacy at its best. What Nasser has done is to win these, and scores of other, Africans over to him and to Egypt.

"This was the pattern wherever I went among the Africans in Egypt: the Kenyans, the Somali—most black Africans—speak of Nasser from their hearts rather than their heads. They know and see his faults. Yet they see him as a brother. To a man they have sat in his office and had tea; to a man they have opened their hearts to him and said they were hungry, oppressed children a long way from home; to a man they will tell you that Nasser fed and clothed them, that he ordered his government to give them lavish offices in mansions once lived in by Farouk's chosen few. Nasser created a forum where these men met the Russians and Chinese, who spend money like water in the hope that one day the water will turn to manganese, gold and cobalt. Both Nasser and his African children smile at this because they know that nonalignment is as far as they are going. They sit back and let the East and West and China fight over them: the only winners will be the nonaligned. This is how they propose to build their dams, smelt their ore, dig their diamonds, mine their gold, sell their cobalt, push their manganese, grow their cotton, fight their wars, feather their own bourgeois nests and free their people."

Mr. Lomax also visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.

"I came away with several fundamental impressions about Africa that I believe will stand the test of time.

"1. The effect of communism as an ideology in Africa is almost nil; the impact of the Communists as people—the Russians and the Chinese—is tremendous.

"2. The Communists have abandoned all overt efforts to win fledgling African states over to communism. For the moment, the Communists are satisfied if the Africans move out of the Western orbit and accept neutralism. The Communists, I am convinced, believe Africa will drift toward socialism and communism once it breaks away from the West.

"3. Nasser's anti-Zionism doesn't make much sense or impact in black Africa; his concept of a black brotherhood does exert influence. Nasser's good, not his evil, will live after him. I found Africans leery of Nasser's preoccupation with the Jews but appreciative of his efforts toward removing colonialism and white domination from the continent.

"4. For the next five years or so, most of the hot battle in the cold war will be fought in Africa. The Africans will see to that. The Africans have not only learned the art of financing their embryonic states by playing East against West, but they have also learned that every internal conflict can be made a cause for world action if the East-West conflict is interjected. As the Congo demonstrates, both East and West have hidden interests in these African states: these interests come to the fore in terms of an internal conflict that immediately bursts into an international issue.

"5. The world is making a grave, if not fatal, mistake by not taking African threats to clear that continent of colonialism and white domination seriously. I am convinced that the Africans mean just what they say and that they will use force only if necessary but fully *expect* that force will be needed.

"I am fully confident that the fate of civilization as we know it will be determined in South Africa. If conditions there remain as they are, then I see no alternative to a bloody race war that will in some measure affect every nation in which both white and nonwhite people live. South Africa is like a man with the bubonic plague—everybody in the community could die from his internal problem. This is not a simple problem. Only imaginative, sensitive and farsighted world statesmanship can head off total human disgrace, if not annihilation, in South Africa.

Africa's Revolt to Come

"Turning to the shape of things in African states, I find myself racked with mixed emotions. As an American Negro who is committed to integration, I am disturbed by African politicians who say white people must get out of politics. It sounds good, and at first hearing it sounds right. The shattering moment comes when one realizes that the Africans are saying that the ethnic majority should form the government in its own image. This argument becomes even more egregious, at least so it seems to me, when the Africans contend that an indigenous people have a right to form the government. This means, for example, that Europeans who have been in South Africa longer than Negroes have been in America have, at best, only squatters' rights.

"This, of course, is turn-about. What one sees in Africa is change, not progress; betterment for the black man, but disappointment for the humanist. And for this reason I find virtue in the fact that Africans don't have enough trained people to run their governments. Practical necessity is integration's last hope in Africa.

"As Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic and Ethiopia are already demonstrating, it will be some time before democracy as we know it comes to Africa.

"This means, of course, that the major African revolt is yet to come. The masses still evidence what Richard Wright calls a 'dependency mentality.' In time they will demand the right to grow up, they will insist upon sharing the rights, freedoms and advantages now enjoyed by the leadership class. The extension of the African revolt will provide the world, particularly the West, a second chance to express its convictions about the rights of African individuals. This time the cards could well be stacked in favor of the West: so many of the current African leaders are identified with anti-West neutralism it could well be that their opposition will abandon that view. There are moves in this direction in Ghana, Guinea and Ethiopia even now. These moves could be significant, particularly if they can avoid the pitfall of extreme partisanship.

"I did not visit West Africa, where racial tensions reportedly are less explosive, and I do not wish to paint all Africa with the same brush. But West Africa is reinvolved in the question of independence as East Africa seeks to shake off the shackles of colonialism and white domination. The crux of Pan-Africanism is that none of Africa is free until all of Africa is divested of nonblack interests, and I am certain that the leaders of West Africa would not part company with East Africans should the latter follow an antiwhite path. Africa—all of it—is a problem for politicians, not writers. Even so, I venture two comments:

Racism Is the Irritant

"First, we would do well to take an all-out stand against racism. The attacks upon whites in the Congo were shocking proof that black men are learning to hate. As a black man, I have seen and felt this hate; it is more than prejudice, it is a desire to destroy.

"It occurs to me that private American foundations would do their country and the world a great service if they would underwrite a World Conference on Race Relations—a gathering of various spokesmen in the field of race relations, to arrive at a code of racial fair play. Such a policy could then be urged upon the nations of the world through the United Nations. I have great faith in this suggestion. I feel certain Africans would welcome it as an opportunity to draw world attention to the unbelievable conditions now existing in Mozambique, Angola and Southwest Africa. African settlers would also favor such a conference for it would create an international atmosphere which would protect their civil rights in Africa. From an American point of view, such a conference would give us the initiative, perhaps the leadership, in a broad move to remove racism from the arena of world politics.

"Secondly, the United Nations has a natural role in Africa. But it must find a way to join issues before, not after, they explode in violence and the world powers have chosen sides. The case of Southwest Africa, it seems to me, affords an excellent opportunity for preventative action. Practically every student of Africa holds that South Africa has illegally annexed Southwest Africa. In his recent book, *The Death of Africa*, Peter Ritner flatly suggests that a United Nations army march into Southwest Africa under the same legal sponsorship that put Tanganyika, also a former League of Nations trust, under the United Nations. I agree, but I feel South Africa would yield if she knew the remainder of the world really meant business.

"Modern Africa is an unmistakable call for the return to basic human principles. The big powers cannot on the one hand spout liberal sentiments about freedom and civil rights while supplying arms to South Africa and Portugal with the other. This is particularly true since the same big powers that do business with these oppressive nations have called for a ban on the sale of arms to Africans. This is not an easy matter to resolve. It goes to the heart of the Western defense machine. But what will it profit the West if it gains a maximum of external security and then dies from the internal cancer of racism?

"For racism is the irritant on Africa's raw nerves—not colonialism, but that *white* people have colonized *black* people; not settler domination, but that *white* settlers have dominated indigenous *black* people; not economic exploitation, but that *white* people have exploited *black* people; not social discrimination, but that the *white* power structure sets itself apart from *black* masses; not denial of civil rights, but that *white* people deny *black* people their civil rights." (*The Reluctant African*)

MAN'S RELATIONS TO MAN

Whether and in what form Jews can survive as a group is a recurrent problem that took new form with the establishment of the State of Israel.

ARE THE JEWS DISAPPEARING?

In an address to the World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem, the Prime Minister of Israel discusses the prerequisites for survival.

David Ben Gurion

"Except for the Orthodox minority—which is not Zionist by name but fulfills the duty of immigration—the Judaism of the Jews of the United States and similar countries is losing all meaning, and only a blind man can fail to see the danger of extinction, which is spreading without being noticed.

"In Israel there are not two spheres, a special Jewish one for matters of tradition and religion and a general human sphere covering economic life, science, labor and cultural affairs. Here everybody is both Jewish and universal. . . .

"In the Diaspora—despite the great differences between the communities in various countries and continents and under various regimes—Jewish life is marked by certain common characteristics. The Jew is subordinate to a non-Jewish authority in all his material, political and cultural life. . . .

"An all-pervasive duality is created in the lives of those Jews who try to maintain their Jewishness because of the tremendous gulf between the Jewish sphere and the civic one. In several countries there is also a conflict between the two, for example behind the Iron Curtain and in some Moslem countries.

"And since culture is not merely a collection of memories of the past or religious customs, but the totality of the human and social environment, saturated by the influences of nature, economics, politics, and social and political struggles and development, there cannot possibly be a full and complete Jewish culture in the Diaspora, even in those free countries which grant Jews every right. . . .

"Even the religious minority, which is rooted in the religious tradition of the centuries before the emancipation, cannot fully maintain the religious laws, because the Jewish religion, unlike any other, is a characteristic product of the land of Israel, and is bound up in its existence and duties to the land of its birth.

"A large part of the laws cannot be observed in the Diaspora, and since the day when the Jewish state was established and the gates of Israel were flung open to every Jew who wanted to come, every religious Jew has daily violated the precepts of Judaism and the Torah of Israel by remaining in the Diaspora. Whoever dwells outside the land of Israel is considered to have no God, the sages said.

"Every Jew who is concerned for the future of the Jewish people, and who holds the name of Jew dear above every other, must realize that without Jewish education for the younger generation, to imbue him with a more profound Jewish consciousness and deepen his roots in Israel's history and the unity of the people, Jewry in the Diaspora is on the road to assimilation

and extinction. . . . In several totalitarian and Moslem countries, Judaism is in danger of death by strangulation; in the free and prosperous countries it faces the kiss of death, a slow and imperceptible decline into the abyss of assimilation. . . .

"In Israel too, Jewish consciousness must also be intensified among the youth. They must be rooted in the Jewish people's past and its spiritual heritage in all the generations. . . .

"But the radiating influence of Israel alone will not sustain Jewry in the Diaspora and insure its continued existence, unless it develops its own forces to strengthen its roots in Jewish consciousness and its devotion to our historical heritage—by giving a Hebrew education to the youth and increasing their personal attachment to Judaism and to Israel. Hebrew as a common language to all Diaspora Jewry . . . is a precondition for the unity and survival of the people."

Jewish education must also stress the Messianic vision of redemption, which has been central to Jewish history. This vision of "the redemption of the Jewish people and of all mankind is not the doctrine of the 'mission' of those intoxicated by emancipation, which involves the obliteration of the national character of Judaism. Nor is it the doctrine of extreme nationalism which considers only itself, its hopes and desires. It is rather the national Jewish mission integrated with a universal human mission. . . .

"Jewish education, the vision of Messianic redemption for Jewry and the world, and growing personal ties with Israel through *aliya* [immigration] —these are the three things that can bring together and unify all sections of Jewry, insure Jewish survival in the Diaspora, and enhance the security and prosperity of the State of Israel." (Address, World Zionist Congress, Jerusalem, Dec. 28, 1960)

HOW JEWISH ARE ISRAELI JEWS?

An Israeli writer and teacher finds the younger generation in Israel less "Jewish" in some ways than their New York contemporaries.

Matti Meged

"The Israeli intellectual of the 30's and 40's . . . was characterized, first of all, by his passionate interest in the interrelations—obvious and hidden alike—of all fields of human activity, in the past and in the present. . . . Plato and Marx, Freud and Nietzsche, Lenin and Bergson, were not merely figures of academic interest, but witnesses to the truth or falsity of some *Weltanschauung* that also provided the criteria by which the daily conduct of individuals and nations could be judged.

"Of course, much of this talk was naive, and more of it suffered from the typical defects of fanatically ideological thinking. It tended to ignore the variety and complexity of things; it was often dilettantish; and it showed insufficient regard for the rigorous requirements of the various disciplines. Yet there was also real intellectual curiosity; there was the feeling that no matter what a man's 'field' might be, he was responsible for worrying about culture, history, and politics; and there was a genuine belief that 'nothing human is alien to me.' All this was bound to lead to superficial conclusions and hasty generalizations, but it also helped to cultivate fire and zeal—a zeal to find the right way for one's self, one's people, and the world as a whole.

"As I have already implied, there was something very Jewish about this hunger for absolute truth and this effort to discover the right way for the entire world. Though most Israeli intellectuals of the 30's and 40's were

ardently repudiating their Jewish heritage—some of them even going so far as to declare that they did not belong to the Jewish people at all but rather to a new Hebrew nation—and were determined to show how very different they were from their ancestors, nevertheless they were the true heirs of those denied ancestors in more than one way. Even their denial of the Jewish heritage, marked so often by self-hatred, was very Jewish, as was the fantastic bitterness with which 'mere' theoretical disagreements were argued. . . . Typically Jewish, too, was the belief of those young people that there was only *one* road to the redemption of the world, a road everyone must choose if he considered himself a responsible man—and the area of responsibility was all-embracing.

Utilitarianism and provincialism

"By contrast, the young Israeli student of today—whether he is studying literature, philosophy, science, or history—is practical, utilitarian, and narrowly professional. . . . By and large, he is content with imported books, plays, and ballets—not first-rate, most of them—and he tends to act more like a provincial consumer of culture than someone engaged in establishing a living connection with spiritual activity in other parts of the world.

"The general intellectual atmosphere in Israel today is marked by a similar narrowness. Writers, for example, no longer seem to consider their work as one aspect of the whole search going on around them for the meaning of things. So too with politicians, army officers, engineers, and the newer members of the kibbutz movement, none of whom would dream of asserting the existence of some relation between the 'spiritual' world and their daily life and work.

"Much of what I have been describing is obviously not peculiar to Israel. . . . But the Israeli situation does have certain special features of its own. First of all, the revolutionary stage, which demanded unlimited commitment to the cause of establishing a state, is over, and professionalism is now needed rather than ardent ideological devotion. . . .

"Secondly, there is the new attitude toward the relation between Israel and the Diaspora. . . . Whether or not the young Israelis regard themselves as Jews, they do not really feel an attachment or a commitment to Jewish history and fate. They are certainly much less fanatic in denying and condemning the Diaspora and its heritage than their fathers or older brothers were. But a 'liberal' attitude towards Jewish history, or even toward other Jewish communities, does not necessarily involve a deep feeling of kinship with that history or those communities. On the contrary, the early deniers of their Jewish heritage were much more attached to it—spiritually, psychologically, and even practically—than the tolerant young of today. By their attempt to redeem the tragic fate of 2,000 years of Jewish history, the first generations of Zionists not only showed the depth of their involvement in that history, but also carried forward the traditional Jewish dream of redemption. The young Israeli, on the other hand, neither hates nor denies this heritage; he simply does not know what to do with it. . . .

"One can of course say—as many Israelis do—that this is a sign of the 'normalization' of Jewish life in Israel. The Israeli is wholly a Jew, whether he 'breaks his head' over it or not. He lives among Jews, he has no need of justifications for being Jewish, and he has no cause for ambiguous feelings about his Jewishness. His language, culture, literature *are* Jewish, even if he chooses not to define them as such. And he is a citizen of a state whose proclaimed *raison d'être* is to be an open refuge for every Jew in need of refuge. Thus—so the argument runs—it is mere sentimentality and nostalgia to lament the loss of 'Jewish feeling' among the young Israelis. . . .

"While it is true that the young Israeli is a Jew quite as a matter of

course, it is also true that he is *only* an Israeli Jew, which means that the scope (both in time and in space) of his national identity is confined within the limits of a tiny Middle Eastern country. This fact necessarily exercises a severely narrowing influence upon all his cultural and intellectual activity, and upon his moral attitudes in general. Since he believes that the establishment of the State has by itself solved the historical problems of Jewish existence, he has released himself from a profound involvement in these problems and is thus driven into a frame of reference limited exclusively to the present.

"Deep in his heart, however, he still regards himself as more than merely a citizen of a small country—that is, the fact of his Jewishness ironically provides him with a sense of self-importance that being an Israeli could never give him—and therefore his cultural provincialism is not so 'normal' as it may seem. Here and there one already detects signs of an awareness that the present situation is unhealthy. But as yet there has been no conscious rebellion against the provincialism that has come to define the cultural atmosphere of Israel, and certainly no awareness that the young Israeli's attitude toward his Jewishness is a major factor in the situation.

"I do not wish to create the impression that I consider the loss of 'Jewish feeling' an unmitigated disaster. Not only is the process I have been trying to describe inevitable; it has also helped to remedy some of the traditional defects of the Jewish character. What I am saying, however, is that it may yet go too far and deprive the young Israelis of even those elements of their Jewish tradition that can and should be maintained in Israel (though I would not venture to say how this might be done). Let us not forget, too, that this very 'normalization' itself participates in the deterioration of standards throughout the world—against which, I still believe, Jewishness can serve as a useful protection. . . .

The contrast with New York

"What impressed me, then, about the young Jewish students and the other Jewish intellectuals I met in New York was that many of them were much more *Jewish* than their opposite numbers in Israel. By this I do not mean that they looked or talked or behaved in conformity with Jewish stereotypes. Nor do I mean that they were more explicitly committed to Judaism or the Jewish community than their Israeli counterparts. Most of them, in fact, showed very little interest in Jewish history, culture, and religion, and no interest at all in the official Jewish community—except to the extent that they were preoccupied with the question of what being Jewish can mean to a thoroughly assimilated American intellectual.

"What makes them more Jewish than their contemporaries in Israel, it seems to me, is the fact that they still maintain a broad intellectual curiosity joined with a sense of personal, moral obligation to history which expresses itself in the feelings of guilt that afflict them when they are not attached to some 'messianic' cause, when they are not actively giving a messianic meaning to their lives. (But let me make it perfectly clear that I do not consider broad intellectual curiosity to be typically Jewish unless it is mixed with the other qualities I specified above.)

"I must add, however, that while the Jewish intellectuals I met in America reminded me of those I knew in Israel ten or twenty years ago, there were also some sharp differences. . . . The Israelis of the 40's really thought that they could solve the problems that concerned them and they really tried to live by the solutions they found. So far as I could tell from my brief encounter with intellectual life in New York, no such naive belief in the immediate relevance, applicability, or efficacy of ideas exists there. I was as much impressed by the air of detachment, even of aloofness, that sur-

rounds intellectual discussion in New York as I was by the wide scope of interests and the great sensitivity to politics and morality that the American intellectuals exhibited." ("The Jewish Intellectual in Israel," *Commentary*, January 1961)

HOW JEWISH ARE AMERICAN JEWS?

Miss Syrkin edits the American Labor Zionist organ Jewish Frontier.

Marie Syrkin

"The truly religious Jew, for whom Judaism is an absolute and supernatural faith has, I assume, no problems in regard to his Jewish identity. . . . But most American Jews cannot be included in that category of assurance, no matter how encouraging the statistical reports in regard to growing congregations and increased attendance at temples in suburbia. What chance for survival, in significant Jewish terms, is there for this Jewry, no longer deeply rooted in Orthodox Judaism? . . .

"An Irish Catholic can disregard his ethnic origins, become an unhyphenated American and remain a Catholic. His children need never trouble themselves about Erin if such is their wish. Should he move in another direction and become a renegade Catholic, he can still remain a proud Irish nationalist. The peculiar dilemma by which abandonment of either the faith or the people becomes total apostasy is a unique Jewish predicament or blessing, depending on how you view the matter. . . . As long as a man says, 'I am a Jew,' he is involved in a whole to which, whether he likes it or not, his allegiance must be dual. No matter how he may chafe at either bond, his very cries of outrage are a measure of his involvement, and his only release can be through assimilation or conversion. The latter are few and dramatic departures; the corrosion of assimilation, however, in its various forms—from red to red-white-and-blue—is constant, and I think increasingly constant in our society. . . .

Cultural assimilation

"If many American Jews attend their temples more out of social conformity than out of spiritual exaltation they are not more reprehensible in this than their Gentile neighbors. From synagogue to golf course they faithfully reproduce the institutional pattern of their environment and, though it is customary to speak of the invisible ghetto in which the American Jewish community dwells, within those well-cushioned walls no special Jewish character or culture emerges. The cultural assimilation of American Jewry is almost complete. . . .

"And why not? There is nothing remarkable in the fact that a group adopts the values of its society and environment. Or that an able, energetic people creates a comfortable or luxurious life for itself when the opportunity permits. What troubles one is the question of how long will biological cohesion *suffice*, or—more alarming still—how long can it *continue* without impelling intellectual or spiritual drives which are specifically Jewish? . . .

"Assuming that a bovine Jewishness—placidly chewing the cud of conformity—could exist for any appreciable period, it would be highly questionable if such existence were in itself a cause for congratulation. But the hypothesis is academic. Such a Jewry could not perpetuate itself beyond a generation or two." Tremendous shocks stirred American Jewry "to the self-awareness now expressed in the circuit of its current activities. Catastrophe, however, in whatever part of the world it might occur, cannot be a people's hope. . . . Already we have a generation that knew not Hitler, and there are Jewish parents who cannot bring themselves to tell their children of the fate of the six million. . . . The horror of this confrontation

is intolerable, and I understand the successful young Harvard professor of my acquaintance who tries to keep such knowledge from his ten-year-old son. . . . His Jewish attachments are of the most tenuous; consequently, he cannot weigh down his child with a burden of irrational, zoological suffering which only a profound religious or national piety can transmute into the endurable. . . .

The trend to intermarriage

"Perhaps one may detect, by local sampling, a trend for the 60's. Intermarriage, among the *intelligentsia*, is one of them. And indeed what rational argument can one offer an emancipated intellectual against intermarriage?"

For the children of these marriages "involvement in the majority culture results in a painless assimilation. Within a generation, the Jewish origin of a gifted parent becomes only a piquant curiosity with no relevance for his descendants. Much Jewish talent and intelligence are quietly departing from the Jewish people in the present time—more than the sociologists with their approximate figure of a 10 per cent intermarriage rate would indicate.

"And supposing these able second-generation or third-generation American Jews . . . do not intermarry? What is their present active bond with the Jewish people, the Jewish faith, or both? Frequently none. Their hour of disquiet comes when their children are old enough to ask for explanations: What is a Jew? Why are they Jews? I have watched scenes of near-panic in which the parent tries to evolve a mutually satisfying answer. . . . The solution appears to consist in a hodgepodge of folklore and ceremonial observed not for itself but to fill an otherwise uncomfortable void. . . .

Synthetic holidays

"I was present at a Hanukah party bravely contrived by a few college women—all the wives of academicians in the Cambridge community. . . . Despite a devout pilgrimage to the local Barton's candy-store, the songs and games were artificial. The children were not deceived by the synthetic holiday. One bright lad was clearly worried; he wanted to know if the current merriment was being offered as a substitute for Christmas, and when mamma to cheer him up promised Hanukah presents, he promptly announced that the Hanukah presents he most wanted were nice ornaments for his Christmas tree. . . .

"In a secular society where religion has become a sign of conformity rather than of blazing difference . . . there is no reason to expect a higher temperature among emancipated American Jews than may be found among their neighbors. And in this atmosphere of tolerant air-conditioning many cool chambers beckon—Unitarian, Ethical Culture or Jewish Christian Science.

"There remains . . . the sense of Jewish nationalism, the awareness that one belongs to one people. East European immigrants who came at the turn of the century—many of them demonstratively irreligious and triumphant in their newly acquired emancipation—created a world of their own with its own language and folk customs. . . .

The vanishing national culture

"With the integration of the immigrant into American life, that transplanted culture vanished. . . . In that former world, there also developed the several parties of the Zionist movement which, each in its own way, sustained the sense of Jewish purpose and identity. . . . But what about the post-Hitler American Jewry, soon to come of age, for whom the climactic experiences of our century already have the distance of history? Can Zionism play the role in their lives that it did in the hearts of two previous generations? Of course not. . . .

"They are integrated into the pattern of American life, content in their technological paradise, and proudly at home as Americans. It is for Jews a new and singular experience—this natural inclusion in a society in which

difference in religious practice invites no serious disability and where ethnically homogeneous groups revolve naturally around their centers of worship. . . .

"In this present, it is idle to assume that Zionism can again be the motive power for Jewish life that it has been—not because American Jews are less idealistic but because they are in a different historical situation. In this sense, the crisis for Zionism is also a crisis for Judaism. . . . When *Zionists* turn into *friends,* Jewishness, if not Israel, has lost. . . .

"There seems to be every indication that despite intermarriage and falling away on an increasing scale, the bulk of American Jewry will continue on its present course—the pattern that we see today. There will be Jews and Jewish centers. The core will remain, but it will not be the saving remnant: neither in its ethnic culture not in its religious intensity will it be significantly Jewish. It will be American, as it must be. . . .

"I do not believe that the existence or well-being of American Jewry [is] threatened. Nor do I believe that the only good life for a Jew is in the Jewish State. American Jews certainly know the good life—and I use the term not ignobly—as equal participants in American democracy. But a complete life as a Jew can only be experienced in full sincerity in the Jewish State. There the destructive contradictions disappear. The Jewishness of American Jewry will flourish in the measure that it maintains a vital personal relationship to the Jewish State, and in the measure that Jewish education and practice acquire greater intensity and content." ("Have American Jews a Jewish Future?" *Jewish Frontier,* January 1961)

An associate professor of anthropology and sociology at Queens College, New York, examines trends among Chicago Jews that indicate a reversal in the process of assimilation.

Erich Rosenthal

When Jews in Chicago began moving out of the areas of first settlement, the old "ghetto," they tended to scatter in somewhat lower concentrations. But in the more recent shifts of Chicago's Jewish population, this tendency has been reversed.

"Since the end of the war, the nearly even distribution of the Jewish population over all parts of the city, together with the orderly streams of internal migration from one status area to another, has given way to a high concentration in the northern neighborhoods and suburbs. . . . Nearly 60 per cent have settled into one area, stretching from Albany Park in the southwest within the city to Highland Park, the northernmost suburb on Lake Michigan." The average proportion of Jews in this area is about 40 per cent in the city and 30 per cent in suburban towns, but in neighborhoods of each the Jewish concentration is 90 per cent or more.

The theory of the "race-relations cycle" predicates a normal trend toward resettlement of an ethnic group in progressively smaller clusters and progressively lower concentrations within these clusters. According to this theory, a contrary tendency toward increased segregation, such as has developed in the present instance, should signify the stoppage or reversal of the process of alienation of the individual from the group, acculturation, and accretion in status.

In the case of alienation, this seems to have occurred.

One aspect of acculturation, Americanization, seems little affected. But another, secularization, appears to have been reversed. Religious activity has increased in the new area. As for status, "the very fact that an ethnic group occupies a new area in such large numbers may tend to lower the status of the area in its own eyes and in those of the community at large."

This reversal of the race-relations cycle of the prewar period has been characterized as self-ghettoization. But it also "can be interpreted in a different—and, in my opinion, a more correct—manner. . . .

"The surrender of the West and South Sides to the nonwhite population, the availability of residential vacant land on the North Side, the desire and economic ability to get housing that meets today's standards, all contributed to the relocation of the Jewish population in a specific area."

Ethnic cohesion in the U.S.

Moreover, the individual's relation to the group in the United States differs fundamentally from that in Central and Western Europe. There, "assimilation was the price demanded from the Jews for their legal and social emancipation." The individual or family sought improved status through separation from the Jewish community. But in the United States, the descendants of East European Jews have been impelled toward the values of cohesion and group survival, rather than assimilation, by their "attributes of peoplehood, such as language, autonomous community life, and size and settlement pattern of the population."

American conditions reinforced this tendency in various ways. "Since immigration to the United States occurred in waves of ethnic groups, each group started at or near the bottom and was moved upward by an escalator set in motion by succeeding 'waves.'" The Jewish labor movement also raised the status of the Jewish workers as a group, rather than on an individual basis. "Moreover, the existence of Jewish neighborhoods facilitated the organization of voters into parts of political machines. . . . With the inheritance of a strong ingroup feeling and successful collective organization for survival, assimilation was not a desirable goal."

Jewish acculturation seems to have been faster than that of other groups that arrived in the United States at about the same time. "It appears that the Jewish population has achieved a high economic, educational, and occupational status. . . .

"Today there is little that marks the Jew as a Jew except Jewish self-consciousness and association with fellow Jews." This absence of strong religious or cultural differences encourages intermarriage. "To forestall this, the parents favor residence in a neighborhood that has such a high density of Jewish families that the probability of their children marrying a Jewish person approaches certainty. . . .

Jewish self-consciousness

"The one factor which currently operates against assimilation, the final step in the race-relation cycle, is Jewish self-consciousness, or identification with the Jewish group." Despite the decline in cultural differences, Jewish self-consciousness appears to have increased, largely as a result of fear of anti-Semitism, and the fact that the Nazis defined a Jew on the basis of ancestry. The establishment of the State of Israel is also commonly believed to have contributed to this heightened self-consciousness.

There has been a systematic effort to heighten this self-consciousness through Jewish education and voluntary segregation. A third way of forestalling large-scale assimilation is residence in a high-status area. "Settlement there removes the stigma that is usually attributed to a separate ethnic community which, according to the scheme of the race-relations cycle, is reserved for unacculturated immigrants. Residence in a high-status area indicates to Jews as well as non-Jews the voluntary nature of the settlement."

Secularization, however, is still characteristic of most American Jews. In the United States it preceded and contributed to acculturation. "Compared with Protestants and Catholics, Jews exhibit the highest degree of secularization." ("Acculturation Without Assimilation? The Jewish Community of Chicago, Illinois," *The American Journal of Sociology*, November 1960)

CHANGING SOCIAL MORES

THE FUTURE OF PREMARITAL SEX

A 19-year-old college junior examines the possible impact of a "perfect" birth-control pill on the sexual behavior of the American college girl. Her article is based partly on a poll of some 200 students by Mademoiselle.

Ellen Willis

The Food and Drug Administration's acceptance of Enovid, the first oral contraceptive on the American market, makes it "a distinct possibility that the not too distant future will see the perfection of the ideal in birth control: an oral contraceptive that is cheap, readily available, easy to use and foolproof."

What effect will this revolutionary development have on our sex mores? Girls brought up in the tradition of today's sexual ethic may not be much affected but, "in all logic, the advent of 100 per cent effective contraception should make far-reaching changes in our feelings and ideas about the meaning of sex. Specifically, once the factor of illegitimate children is eliminated, society will no longer have any reason to concern itself with mutually desired sexual activity between individuals. Our basic economic and sociological institution is the family; because children born out of wedlock are threats to this institution, society has been strongly condemnatory of women who transgress the sexual code. But with a perfect contraceptive the symbols of social stigma against such transgressors—the unwed mother, the child taunted because he has no father, the furtive abortionist, the 'shotgun wedding'—will gradually disappear, and with them no doubt the stigma itself.

"Society, while still perhaps giving lip service to the traditional moral code, will no longer impose a stricter standard on women than it does on men. Since the idea of immorality is closely linked with the amount of social approval or disapproval connected with an act, people will tend to think of sex not as a moral question but as one of personal happiness. Religion should have some influence in stopping or slowing down this trend. However, its influence will be weakened by the fact that our society is becoming increasingly secular. . . .

"The perfect contraceptive should also remove much of the psychological resistance that prevents women from having relations before marriage. . . . It is likely that when women no longer have to consider, even subconsciously, the possibility of conception, their psychology regarding sex will come to approximate that of men."

Still, there are many factors that have nothing to do with the chance of pregnancy. A woman's physical desire "is diffuse and hard to distinguish from emotion. Unless a woman's emotional as well as physical needs are satisfied, she finds the sexual act frustrating. Also, the woman's part in sex entails complete surrender; she is the one who 'gives herself.' For these reasons it is absolutely necessary to most healthy women that they love and trust a man totally before they can submit to him sexually. For men this necessity does not exist in the same degree. . . .

"How much, actually, does fear of pregnancy in itself prevent girls from

engaging in premarital sex?" The results of *Mademoiselle's* poll of college students appear to agree with the opinion of one student that "most of the girls who 'will' will anyway, with or without the assurance of safety."

Would student marriages, already a phenomenon of large and growing proportions, increase greatly if the risks of undesired and inconvenient pregnancy were eliminated? Responses to the questionnaire suggest "that most girls in deciding the question of early marriage give as little consideration to the possibility of pregnancy as those contemplating premarital intercourse. . . .

"Perhaps the most important factor in determining how oral contraception will affect college students is simply how they feel about contraceptives in general and the birth-control pill in particular. The majority of college girls polled favor contraception for the purposes of planning families wisely, preventing the misery of abortions and illegitimate children and relieving the overpopulation of the Orient. However, there is much less agreement on the question of the pill itself. Many girls expressed fear of the physiological effects of the pill: 'I don't like the idea of playing around with hormones!' While these fears could be interpreted as the usual resistance to a new thing, which will gradually fade once the pills are in common use, they could also indicate that many women, given a choice, would prefer a mechanical measure that does not interfere with the reproductive process itself.

A question of confidence

"In addition—and perhaps most revealing of all—a significant number, though a minority, of girls doubted the possibility of a 'perfect' contraceptive" with every single pill foolproof. "If women should refuse to believe that contraceptive pills guarantee more safety than the careful use of existing methods, if the virtue of the new drug is to be considered rather in terms of easy use and the pleasure of freedom from mechanical encumbrances—then the possibility of conception, no matter how remote, would still have a chastening influence on sexual behavior. . . .

"Today's college students of both sexes are strongly influenced by a credo that might be called 'idealism' as distinct from morality and fear . . . a belief that sex is the most elemental closeness of which human beings are capable; that it is one of the few deeply important matters of life; that therefore it should be treated as a precious thing and preserved from any usage that might reduce it to a merely physical level. As one girl put it: 'I don't think promiscuity is immoral. I think if such conduct makes a girl happy, that's her business. But—well—it's just *insensitive!*' . . .

"Today's young women have been brought up to believe that they can achieve the utmost in sexual happiness; that intercourse must be an ecstatic, uninhibited surrender to emotion. Psychologists may argue whether this belief—which is part and parcel of our modern idea of romantic love—is good or bad for women, but either way it puts tremendous emphasis on the choice of a partner and is as much a moral force in its way as any strict Victorian code. Oral contraception should not have any effect on this attitude; if anything, the pills should make 'idealism' stronger, as fear of pregnancy will no longer obscure the issue."

Some predictions

Certain positive predictions about the effects of the pill seem justified: "First, that undoubtedly the number of girls who are not virgins at marriage will increase, but by too small a number to cause more than a ripple in our great ocean of sexual tradition; second, that the pill will have no effect whatsoever on most women's desire for sex with one man within a permanent love relationship. It is within marriage that the pill should have its greatest impact, making sex a happier, freer act for those who choose

to limit their families. There will surely be many changes in statistics—from the number of illegitimate pregnancies and the college dropout rate to the unrecorded number of embittered young couples trapped into marriage and tired mothers flinching from relations with their husbands. But anyone who expects a moral revolution will almost certainly be disappointed; for as one college student expressed it, 'There will never be a pill that can stop women from being women.'" ("The Birth-Control Pill," *Mademoiselle*, January 1961)

HOW ADULT CAN TV DRAMA BE?

Mr. Freedman is the producer of The Play of the Week, *a series of weekly drama programs now in its second year.*

Lewis Freedman

"Last year, in addition to the 47,000 letters we received urging us to stay on the air, we heard from one dissatisfied Long Island housewife who wrote, in part, 'Dear *The Play of the Week*, My family saw *Medea* and thought that it marked the beginning of an exciting new TV series. Not only did the mother send a poisoned robe and crown to her husband's girlfriend, she killed both her children for revenge. We looked forward to the show every week, hoping for more like that, sort of a classical *Untouchables*, What has happened?'

"This note caused a great deal of consternation in the *The Play of the Week* office; we thought we'd been producing an A-1 television show and suddenly we discovered we were short on gunplay. . . .

"Someone recently remarked that when sex is taken out of the theater, the vacuum is filled with violence. (Like background music substitution for love in the movies.) And I remember the trepidation with which we approached each new property last year. At our first meeting even before *Medea* we talked about *The Iceman Cometh;* too adult?

"Each week was going to be the last; the audience wouldn't take it. What would they say when they saw *Burning Bright* which was not only about adultery, but said so? That was our third week; they watched it and liked it.

"How would we dare to produce *The Waltz of the Toreadors,* a play about a slightly lecherous general, even if he was a French general? Critical raves and enthusiastic audience response.

"Even that nineteenth-century Swedish heroine, Miss Julie, might be too advanced. Was the twentieth century American audience ready to hear the line, 'A whore's a whore'? After all, this was still the year when *'Tis a Pity She's a Whore* was the limit of residential marquee frontiers. (I must admit we quit while we were ahead on that one and substituted 'A slut's a slut' for out-of-town consumption.) Still no revolution, no picket lines of protesting mothers outside 10 Columbus Circle.

"What we were trying to do was present adult theater to an adult audience. The properties weren't picked because they were 'sensational.' They were picked because they represented the best available products of contemporary and past playwrights. They were serious theater because they glowed with ideas and people and feeling from the real world, not from the sterilized world inherited from Hollywood. And a real audience looked and recognized itself. And a real sponsor showed up. . . .

"The sum of the year's experience is to invite a re-examination of the censorship that prevails in television. All too often it curbs the superficial dangers and lets pass the more insidious ones." *(Variety,* Jan. 4, 1961)

THE POLICY-MAKER AND
THE INTELLECTUAL

Henry A. Kissinger

It would be comforting to believe that our foreign policy difficulties are due to specific mistakes of policy which can be reversed more or less easily. Unfortunately, the problem is more deep-seated. It is remarkable that during a decade of crisis few fundamental criticisms of American policy have been offered. We have not reached an impasse because the wrong alternative has been chosen in a "Great Debate." The alternatives have rarely been properly defined.

The stagnation of our policy is often ascribed to the fact that our best people are not in government service. But the more serious and pertinent question is how qualified our eminent men are for the task of policy-making in a revolutionary period. . . .

The American business executive (or the lawyer coming from a business background) who is placed in a high policy-making position is rarely familiar with the substance of the problems into which he finds himself projected, largely because, in the rise through the administrative hierarchy, the executive is shaped by a style of life that inhibits reflectiveness. One of the characteristics of a society based on specialization is the enormous work load of its top personnel. More energies are absorbed in creating a smooth-functioning administrative apparatus than in defining the criteria on which decisions are to be based. Issues are reduced to their simplest terms. Decision-making is increasingly turned into a group effort. The executive's task is conceived as choosing among administrative proposals in the formulation of which he has no part and with the substance of which he is often unfamiliar. A premium is placed on "presentations" which take the least effort to grasp—in practice usually oral "briefing." (This accounts for the emergence of the specialist in "briefings" who prepares charts, one-page summaries, etc.) The result is that in our society the executive grows dependent to an increasing extent on his subordinates' conception of the essential elements of a problem.

In such an environment little opportunity exists for real creativity, or even for an understanding of it. . . . Consciously or not, our top policy-makers often lack the assurance or the conceptual framework to impose a sense of direction on their administrative staffs. Their unfamiliarity

with their subject matter reinforces the already powerful tendency to think that a compromise among administrative proposals is the same thing as a policy....

Two generations of Americans have been shaped by the pragmatic conviction that inadequate performance is somehow the result of a failure to understand an "objective" environment properly and that group effort is valuable in itself. The interaction of several minds is supposed to broaden the range of "experience," and "experience" is believed to be the ultimate source of knowledge. Pragmatism, at least in its generally accepted forms, produces a tendency to identify a policy issue with the search for empirical data. It sees in consensus a test of validity. Pragmatism is more concerned with method than with judgment. Or, rather, it seeks to reduce judgment to methodology and value to knowledge. The result is a greater concern with the collection of facts than with an interpretation of their significance. There occurs a multiplication of advisory staffs and a great reliance on study groups of all kinds, whose chief test is unanimity....

The problem is magnified by the personal humility which is one of the most attractive American traits. Most Americans are convinced that no one is ever entirely "right," or, as the saying goes, that if there is disagreement each party is probably a little in error. The fear of dogmatism pervades the American scene. But the corollary of the tentativeness of most views is an incurable inner insecurity. Even very eminent people are reluctant to stand alone. Torn between the desire to be bold and the wish to be popular, they would like to see their boldness certified, as it were, by general approbation. Philosophical conviction and psychological bias thus combine to produce in and out of government a penchant for policy-making by committee. The obvious insurance against the possibility of error is to obtain as many opinions as possible. And unanimity is important, in that its absence is a standing reminder of the tentativeness of the course adopted. The committee approach to decision-making is often less an organizational device than a spiritual necessity....

The difficulty is not the existence of the committee system but the lengths to which reliance on it is pushed because of the lack of substantive mastery by the highest officials. When policy becomes identified with the consensus of a committee, it is fragmented into a series of *ad hoc* decisions which make it difficult to achieve a sense of direction or even to profit from experience. Substantive problems are transformed into adminstrative ones. Innovation is subjected to "objective" tests which deprive it of spontaneity. "Policy planning" becomes the projection of familiar problems into the future. Momentum is confused with purpose. There is greater concern with how things are than with which things matter. The illusion is created that we can avoid recourse to personal judgment and responsibility as the final determinant of policy.

The impact on national policy is pernicious. Even our highest policy bodies, such as the National Security Council, are less concerned with developing measures in terms of a well-understood national purpose

than with adjusting the varying approaches of semi-autonomous departments. . . .

But in assessing . . . alternatives the risks always seem more certain than the opportunities. No one can ever prove that an opportunity existed, but failure to foresee a danger involves swift retribution. As a result, much of the committee procedure is designed to permit each participant or agency to register objections, and the system stresses avoidance of risk rather than boldness of conception. The committee system is concerned more with co-ordination and adjustment than with purpose.

The committee system not only has a tendency to ask the wrong questions, it also puts a premium on the wrong qualities. The committee process is geared to the pace of conversation. Even where the agenda is composed of memoranda, these are prepared primarily as a background for discussion, and they stand or fall on the skill with which they are presented. Hence, quickness of comprehension is more important than reflectiveness, fluency more useful than creativeness. The ideal "committee man" does not make his associates uncomfortable. He does not operate with ideas too far outside of what is generally accepted. Thus the thrust of committees is toward a standard of average performance. Since a complicated idea cannot be easily absorbed by ear—particularly when it is new—committees lean toward what fits in with the most familiar experience of their members. They therefore produce great pressure in favor of the *status quo*. Committees are consumers and sometimes sterilizers of ideas, rarely creators of them.

Unfortunately, not everything that sounds plausible is important. And many important ideas do not seem plausible—at least at first glance, the only glance permitted by most committees. Rapidity of comprehension is not always equivalent to responsible assessment; it may even be contrary to it.

The attitudes of our high officials and their method of arriving at decisions inevitably distort the essence of policy. Effective policy depends not only on the skill of individual moves, but even more importantly on their relationship to each other. It requires a sense of proportion and a sense of style. All these intangibles are negated when problems become isolated cases, each of which is disposed of on its merits by experts or agencies in the special difficulties it involves. . . .

The more intense the effort to substitute administration for conception, the greater is the inner insecurity of the participants. The more they seek "objectivity," the more diffuse their efforts become. The insecurity of many of our policy-makers sometimes leads to almost compulsive traits. Because of the lack of criteria on which to base judgments, work almost becomes an end in itself. Officials—and other executives as well—tend to work to the point of exhaustion, as one indication that nothing has been left undone. The insecurity is also shown by the fact that almost in direct proportion as advisory staffs multiply they are distrusted by those at the top. Officials increasingly feel the need for "outside"—and therefore unbiased—advice. Memoranda that are produced within the bureaucracy are taken less seriously than similar

papers that are available to the general public. Crucial policy advice is increasingly requested from *ad hoc* committees of outside experts, as, for example, the Gaither Committee on national defense or the Draper Committee on economic assistance or the Coolidge Committee on arms control. . . . As long as our high officials lack a framework of purpose, each problem becomes a special case. But the more fragmented the approach to policy becomes, the more difficult it is to act consistently and purposefully. The typical pattern of our governmental process is therefore endless debate about whether a given set of circumstances is in fact a problem, until a crisis removes all doubts but also the possibility of effective action. . . .

A democracy cannot function without a leadership group which has assurance in relation to the issues confronting it. We face, in short, a test of attitudes even more than of policies.

How about the role of individuals who *have* addressed themselves to acquiring substantive knowledge—the intellectuals? Is our problem, as is so often alleged, the lack of respect shown to the intellectual by our society?

The problem is more complicated than our refusal or inability to utilize this source of talent. Many organizations, governmental or private, rely on panels of experts. Political leaders have intellectuals as advisors. Throughout our society, policy-planning bodies proliferate. Research organizations multiply. The need for talent is a theme of countless reports. What, then, is the difficulty?

Excess demand for experts

One problem is the demand for expertise itself. Every problem which our society becomes concerned about—leaving aside the question of whether these are always the most significant—calls into being panels, committees, or study groups supported by either private or governmental funds. Many organizations constantly call on intellectuals for advice. As a result, intellectuals with a reputation soon find themselves so burdened that their pace of life hardly differs from that of the executives whom they counsel. They cannot supply perspective because they are as harassed as the policy-makers. All pressures on them tend to keep them at the level of the performance which gained them their reputation. In his desire to be helpful, the intellectual is too frequently compelled to sacrifice what should be his greatest contribution to society—his creativity.

Moreover, the pressure is not produced only by the organizations that ask for advice; some of it is generated by the image the intellectual has of himself. In a pragmatic society, it is almost inevitable that the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake should not only be lightly regarded by the community but also that it should engender feelings of insecurity or even guilt among some of those who have dedicated themselves to it. There are many who believe that their ultimate contribution as intellectuals depends on the degree of their participation in what is considered the "active" life. It is not a long step from the willingness to give advice to having one's self-esteem gratified by a consulting relationship with a large organization. And since individuals who challenge the presuppositions of the bureaucracy, governmental or private, rarely can

keep their positions as advisers, great pressures are created to elaborate on familiar themes rather than risk new departures.

The great value our society places on expertise may be even more inimical to innovation than indifference. Not only the executive suffers from overspecialization. The intellectual in this respect is often in the same situation. Panels of experts are deliberately assembled to contain representatives of particular approaches; a committee on military policy will have spokesmen for the "all-out war" as well as for the "limited war" concept. A committee on foreign policy will have spokesmen for the "uncommitted areas" as well as specialists on Europe. These are then expected to adjust their differences by analogy with the sub-committee procedure of the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the result is more often a common denominator than a well-rounded point of view.

This tendency is magnified by the conception of the intellectual held by the officials or organizations that call on him. . . . He is called in as a "specialist" in ideas whose advice is combined with that of others from different fields of endeavor on the assumption that the policy-maker is able to choose intuitively the correct amalgam of "theoretical" and "practical" advice. And even in this capacity the intellectual is not a free agent. It is the executive who determines in the first place whether he needs advice. He and the bureaucracy frame the question to be answered. The policy-maker determines the standard of relevance. He decides who is consulted and thereby the definition of "expertness.". . .

Who asks the questions?

The contribution of the intellectual to policy is therefore in terms of criteria that he has played only a minor role in establishing. He is rarely given the opportunity to point out that a query limits a range of possible solutions or that an issue is posed in irrelevant terms. He is asked to solve problems, not to contribute to the definition of goals. Where decisions are arrived at by negotiation, the intellectual—particularly if he is not himself part of the bureaucracy—is a useful weight in the scale. He can serve as a means of filtering ideas to the top outside of organizational channels or as one who legitimizes the viewpoint of contending factions within and among departments. This is why many organizations build up batteries of outside experts or create semi-independent research groups, and why articles or books become tools in the bureaucratic struggle. In short, all too often what the policy-maker wants from the intellectual is not ideas but endorsement. . . .

Where to draw the line between excessive commitment to the bureaucracy and paralyzing aloofness depends on so many intangibles of circumstance and personality that it is difficult to generalize. Perhaps the matter can be stated as follows: one of the challenges of the contemporary situation is to demonstrate the overwhelming importance of purpose over technique. The intellectual should therefore not refuse to participate in policy-making, for to do so confirms the stagnation of societies whose leadership groups have little substantive knowledge. But in cooperation, the intellectual has two loyalties: to the organization that employs him and to values which transcend the bureaucratic framework and provide his basic motivation. It is important for him to remember that one of his contributions to the administrative process

is his independence, and that one of his tasks is to seek to prevent routine from becoming an end in itself. . . . It is therefore essential for him to return from time to time to his library or his laboratory to "recharge his batteries." If he fails to do this, he will turn into an administrator, distinguished from some of his colleagues only by having been recruited from the intellectual community. . . .

A way must be found to enable our ablest people to deal with problems of policy and to perform national service in their formative years. This is a challenge to our educational system, to the big administrative hierarchies, as well as to national policy. . . .

The United States is at a point in its historical development where it has mastered much of its physical environment. We can, therefore, easily lose our adaptability in our satiety. The price we will pay for this will be all the higher for not having to be paid for a while. Earlier in our history, circumstances imposed the need for innovation. We must now work on treasuring our creativity deliberately. Any society faces a point in its development where it must ask itself if it has exhausted all the possibilities of innovation inherent in its structure. When this point is reached, it has passed its zenith. From then on, it must decline, rapidly or slowly, but nonetheless inevitably. Only a heroic and deliberate effort can arrest narcissism and the collapse which starts at the moment of seemingly greatest achievement.

America is now at such a critical juncture. For a while longer we may be able to hold on to what we have and perhaps even extend our achievement by proceeding along familiar routes. Nonetheless, a turning point can prove decisive even though it is not easily recognizable. In the past some disaster—a depression or a war—usually made the need for innovation manifest. Our generation cannot afford a disaster, particularly in the international field. The question before America is whether it can muster the dedication and creativity *before* the worst has happened. . . .

Identifying the enemy

The stakes could hardly be higher. The deepest cause of the inhumanity of our time is probably the pedantic application of administrative norms. Its symbol is the "commissar," the ideal type of bureaucrat, who condemns thousands without love and without hatred, simply in pursuance of an abstract duty. But we would do ourselves an injustice if we ignored that the commissar is not just a Soviet but a universal phenomenon—the Communists have simply encouraged its most extreme form. He is the leader whose goals are defined by his presumed understanding of historic processes outside of his control, the administrator whose world is defined by regulations in whose making he has had no part.

Our challenge is to overcome an atmosphere in which all sense of reverence for the unique and therefore the capacity for real innovation stands in danger of being lost. The obsession with safety and predictability must produce an attitude fearful of risk and striving to reduce everything, including man himself, to manipulable quantities. The way we face this challenge will determine the spontaneity of our national life, and the future of the concept of the dignity of the individual.

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mitting $1.75. Orders
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